


**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
ACADEMIC YEAR 2018**

CORE CURRICULUM

**THEATER STRATEGY AND
CAMPAIGNING COURSE**

DIRECTIVE



**U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013-5050
28 November 2017 – 12 February 2018**

Middle States Accreditation

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AY 2018

**THEATER STRATEGY
AND
CAMPAIGNING**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
COURSE OVERVIEW	
GENERAL	1
COURSE STRUCTURE	
GENERAL	2
PURPOSE.....	3
SCOPE.....	3
COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES	3
CURRICULUM RELATIONSHIPS.....	3
JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION.....	4
COMPLEMENTARY PROGRAMS.....	4
COURSE CRITIQUE.....	4
COURSE REQUIREMENTS	
GENERAL	4
DAILY READING.....	5
STUDENT ACADEMIC EVALUATION/ASSESSMENT METHODS.....	5
ADDITIONAL STUDENT REQUIREMENT	7
COURSE PLANNING CALENDAR	9
LESSON DIRECTIVES	15
APPENDIX A: USAWC INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING OUTCOMES AY18	125
APPENDIX B: PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES	127
APPENDIX C: SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME Phase II).....	129
APPENDIX D: ENDURING THEMES.....	133
APPENDIX E: CROSSWALKS	135
APPENDIX F: POSITION PAPER RUBRIC.....	137
APPENDIX G: ANALYTICAL ESSAY RUBRIC.....	139
APPENDIX H: ORAL PRESENTATION RUBRIC	141
APPENDIX I: ORAL PRESENTATION CONTENT, ORGANIZATION, DELIVERY, AND STRATEGIC THINKING RUBRIC.....	143
APPENDIX J: SEMINAR CONTRIBUTION RUBRIC	157
APPENDIX K: OFFSITE ACCESS TO COURSE READINGS AND LIBRARY DATABASES.....	149
APPENDIX L: DMSPO STUDENT CRITIQUE	151
APPENDIX M: BLOOM'S TAXONOMY.....	153

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COURSE OVERVIEW

General. *Theater Strategy and Campaigning focuses on the study of strategic and operational art to employ the military instrument of national power in pursuit of achieving national goals.* This course explores and evaluates U.S. military ways and means to connect operational efforts to strategic ends (policy aims) through the understanding, analysis, synthesis and application of doctrine, organizations, and concepts, translated into theater strategies and campaign plans to conduct joint, unified, and multinational operations. TSC also maintains complementary links with the Regional Studies Program (RSP) to emphasize contemporary application of U.S. operational doctrine in relation to U.S. national security interests in specific regions.

TSC aims to build upon the subjects already covered in the core curriculum to develop leaders capable of translating strategic policy and guidance into theater campaign plans that support national objectives. A few students have had personal experience planning at the operational and strategic levels using the Joint Planning Process (JPP) and most students have some experience at the tactical level using the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). TSC leverages those experiences to examine the subtle differences in planning that exist between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The focus of the JPP is on the interaction between an organization's commander and staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, as well as with supporting commanders' staffs. During TSC, students should continuously ask yourself "what is different at this level?"

Students will also conduct a detailed examination of operational design. Operational design is a creative and cognitive *commander-centric* methodology that seeks to develop an understanding of the strategic (national and/or multinational) guidance and objectives combined with a thorough understanding of the operational environment prior to and during campaign planning. This methodology leads to the development of the commander's vision for the conduct of the campaign, which enables the application of operational art through the JPP. The result is strategic concept for sustained employment of military power to facilitate the realization of national and/or multinational policy.

Students apply strategic leader skills and incorporate national strategies as they participate in an active learning environment. At the conclusion of the course, they will have studied the art and science of applying the military instrument of power at the theater-strategic level. Students must actively contribute and participate, think critically, creatively, and systematically at the strategic and operational levels, and apply innovative solutions to complex, ill-defined problems created by uncertainty and dynamic change in the world.

The course flows from understanding the environment of the combatant commander to application of operational design and the Joint Planning Process. Vexing and complex problems associated with traditional warfare, irregular warfare, stability operations, unified commands, theater of war organization, and multinational operations

are addressed throughout the course, culminating with an in-seminar practicum. The practicum is a scenario set in Southeast Asia that provides the foundational background for a hypothetical contingency.

COURSE STRUCTURE

1. General. The course contains five blocks.

Block I: “Strategic Planning,” is the bridge from the concepts taught in National Security Policy and Strategy to the application of those concepts at the theater level in TSC. It reviews strategic guidance through the lens of the combatant commander (CCDR) and develops understanding of the operational environment at the theater strategic level. Block I leverages systems thinking from Strategic Leadership course and enables the students to understand operational art and operational design as they are applied in the formulation and execution of military options, theater campaign planning, execution, and assessment.

Block II: “Military Power Applied” explores “Jointness”, and how the services think, act and present forces to CCDRs. It will explore how we fight today and how emerging concepts are shaping future joint and Service approaches to meeting national security threats. During this block, the students will connect the concepts of the domains introduced in *Theory of War and Strategy*, through the lens of each Service’s current doctrine and future concept, with a view toward what current/future force and capabilities they provide to combatant commanders.

Block III: The "Unified Action" block examines implementing the U.S. National Military Strategy and subsequent theater strategies using all elements of national power through a unified approach in concert with interagency partners, allies and coalition partners in the context of a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. This block also examines the top priority of all our military efforts, homeland defense, through the actions and activities of all combatant commanders in the TMM (Transregional, Multi-domain, Multi-functional) environment.

Block IV: “Campaign Analysis,” examines the integration of the joint functions and the Joint Planning Process using Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE), 1995-96 as a case study. Analyzing OJE to understand the planning and the integration of the joint functions will result in a deeper understanding of the tasks involved in a major combatant command operation.

Block V: “Tying it all together,” generates and reinforces student competence and confidence with operational design at the operational and theater levels. Over the course of a four day (24 hour) experiential learning event you will apply operational art, operational design, and the Joint Functions as members of a geographic combatant commander's staff to develop an operational approach to address a notional contingency within the GCC's AOR.

2. Purpose. This course explores and evaluates U.S. military ways and means to connect operational efforts to strategic ends (policy aims) through the application of joint doctrine, translated into theater strategies and campaign plans to conduct joint, unified, and multinational operations.

3. Scope. TSC examines and applies joint doctrine in planning and conducting unified and multinational operations and analyzes the process through which national strategies are synthesized and translated into theater strategies and campaign plans. Students will study the relationships that the military departments, functional components, and other governmental agencies have with combatant commanders. Recognizing that we exist in a dynamic international environment, students' intellectual pursuits will encompass difficult issues such as the future of joint warfare and the complex issues involved when working with governmental and non-governmental agencies throughout the range of military operations. Recent and current events, as well as historical case studies, are woven throughout the fabric of the course.

4. Course Learning Outcomes. In a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment, graduates of TSC must be able to:

a. Translate national strategic goals into military objectives and provide military advice to civilian leaders in the development of policy and strategy affecting national security. (PLOs 3, 5)

b. Develop military options and operational approaches and evaluate campaign plans to achieve military objectives, in concert with other instruments of national power, which realize national strategic goals. (PLOs 3, 5)

c. Integrate individual Service capabilities, framed through the joint functions across multiple domains, into a joint force that accomplishes military objectives across the range of military operations. (PLOs 2, 3)

d. Evaluate landpower as part of the joint force to implement theater strategies and execute campaigns in a theater of operations. (PLO 3)

5. Curriculum Relationships.

a. TSC seeks to apply knowledge and skills derived from previous courses. In turn, students develop new skills that are essential to developing the requisite expertise to function at the theater-strategic level. TSC integrates operational design and operational art in pursuit of national security objectives while applying the military instrument of power.

b. Theater Strategy and Campaigning is an application course. Specifically, TSC draws upon lessons from the *Introduction to Strategic Studies* course to build on the introduction of key concepts. Lessons in the *Strategic Leadership* course provide the basis to examine "complex problems" using critical and creative thinking, viewed

through a systems lens and cultural realities. Concurrently, students are exposed to the unique aspects of senior leaders and a very complex set of circumstances that require senior officer decisions. TSC also draws on the *Theory of War and Strategy* course, which provides the underpinnings of why wars are waged, ends, ways, means, and a theoretical foundation of doctrinal concepts. The *National Security Policy and Strategy* course provides an excellent precursor to understanding the environment of the Theater Commander, as he/she accepts, derives, and builds upon national guidance to accomplish theater requirements. Finally, TSC and the *Regional Studies Program* (RSP) are conducted concurrently. TSC maintains complementary links with the RSP to emphasize contemporary application of U.S. operational doctrine in relation to U.S. national security interests in specific regions.

c. During the elective period, among other offerings, the Joint Warfighting Advanced Studies Program, and a selection of Campaign Analysis courses, use and apply the concepts and doctrine taught during TSC. TSC is a vital part of the holistic experience of the U.S. Army War College. TSC will help prepare you to function effectively in roles as a strategic advisor, theorist, planner, or leader.

6. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Phase II, senior level, consists of 5 learning areas supported by 26 learning objectives focused primarily on the operational and theater strategic level. See Appendix C. All of the course learning outcomes and lessons in TSC support one or more of the JPME Phase II learning objectives. See Appendix E for detailed crosswalk. The TSC teaching faculty provides representation from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, NSA, and the German Army. Jointness is a part, directly or indirectly, of every lesson in TSC.

7. Complementary Programs. The Noontime Lecture Program provides supplementary material to TSC. Noontime lectures occur periodically in Wil Washcoe Auditorium. Attendees may bring and eat their lunch during the lecture.

8. Course Critique. The computerized Course Critique will be available for you to complete O/A **12 February 2018**. After Action Reviews (AAR's) occur mid-course as well as at the end of the course. You may provide feedback at any time during the course, and you are encouraged to do so. You may provide comments directly to your Faculty Instructor or the Course Director.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. General. This course lends itself to the active learning process, requiring imaginative thought and student interaction. A simplified model to follow is to ask the WHAT of a topic or issue, the WHY of its significance, and the HOW of its utility to professional military responsibilities. The answer to many of these questions is subjective; often no clear-cut solution exists. Do not feel uncomfortable; uncertainty and ambiguity are frequently the norm. Honing creative thinking skills is central to the educational experience of TSC. Meaningful research, diligent preparation, thought-

provoking presentations, and participation and contribution in seminar discussions are the principle ingredients in making the active learning process successful.

2. Daily Reading.

a. Required Readings. You must read this material prior to the class because seminar discussions are based on the readings. Readings provide basic knowledge and analysis of the topic and lesson authors select specific readings to support lesson learning outcomes. In general, you can accomplish the readings in about 2 ½ to 3 hours for each 3-hour seminar session. Follow-on discussions in the seminar room build upon that knowledge and aim to achieve analysis, synthesis, and application of the topic. In seminar, you will review, refine, and integrate previous work into seminar solutions for complex problems. Please note that TSC uses “enabling outcomes” in some lessons. Accomplish these outcomes during your preparation for seminar. The seminar builds upon the enabling outcomes to accomplish lesson outcomes.

b. Suggested and Focused Readings. These readings provide material for additional research. Faculty Instructors may assign these readings to selected students and ask them to provide a brief oral report and analysis to the seminar. These reports may offer an opposing point of view from the required reading, provide a degree of understanding beyond that required in the lesson outcomes, or support one or more of the “Points to Consider” for the lesson.

3. Student Academic Evaluation/Assessment Methods. Students are evaluated on their demonstrated performance towards achieving course learning outcomes. All student coursework and seminar contribution will be assessed by faculty and provide the foundation for the student’s overall course evaluation. TSC assessment methodology is based on two components: 50% for the two writing requirements and 50% for seminar contribution which includes exercise participation and oral presentations (if used). See below for specific details.

a. Writing Requirements.

(1) Students will complete two writing requirements. The first will be a one- to two-page position/information paper focused on responding to questions from a four-star commander, due **17 January 2018**. Your instructor will provide detailed guidance. This first paper will be 20% of the overall evaluation.

(2) The second writing requirement will be a five- to seven-page paper, due **5 February 2018**. Your faculty instructor will provide more detail on this paper as well. The intent of the second paper is to synthesize major points in the course. Topics are related to different aspects of the course learning outcomes. You and your Faculty Instructor will work together to select a topic during the course. This paper will be evaluated in consonance with the AY 2018 Communicative Arts Directive and worth 30% of the overall course evaluation. The Faculty Instructor will provide a copy of the evaluation to the students, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations.

b. Writing with Integrity.

(1) You must avoid plagiarism. Hugo Bedau wrote in *Thinking and Writing About Philosophy*, p. 141: "Writers plagiarize when they use another's words or ideas without suitable acknowledgement. Plagiarism amounts to theft -- of language and thought. Plagiarism also involves deception...[Plagiarism] wrongs the person from whom the words or thoughts were taken and to whom no credit was given; and it wrongs the reader by fraudulently misrepresenting the words or thoughts as though they are the writer's own." Although it sounds like a cliché, when you plagiarize you cheat yourself: first, by not developing the discipline and diligence to research, write, and edit well; second, because taking credit for other people's ideas will induce outrage and resentment against you; and third, because the habit of plagiarism can end your career and destroy your reputation.

(2) To avoid plagiarism, you must cite your sources everywhere in your paper where you use the ideas of others. You must cite them when you quote them directly, and where you paraphrase their points in your own words. In general, you should only use direct quotes when you find the author's wording to be especially effective. Your paraphrasing or summarizing other authors' points should be thorough. It is not fair to an author to change only a couple of words in a paragraph and then imply (by not using direct quotes) that the paragraph is entirely your own prose. It might help to imagine the author reading over your shoulder. Finally, using other's thoughts in academic writing is beneficial especially when you are not an expert in the field. Their research, their expertise, their conclusions, or analysis can strengthen your paper's argument and, therefore, their work should be used to good effect to make your paper more persuasive.

c. Seminar Contribution.

(1) Students must be actively involved in the seminar learning process - sharing ideas, analyses, and knowledge - and have a responsibility for establishing and contributing to seminar goals. Contribution involves being a good listener, an articulate spokesperson for a particular point of view, and an intelligent, tactful questioner or challenger of ideas. Contribution can include student performance in the seminar discussions and group work, as well as formal and informal oral presentations and exercises. General contribution will consist of 30% of the overall course evaluation, up to 10% of the contribution's 30% may be allocated to the overall grade, if the FI chooses to use oral presentations (i.e. 20% class discussion and 10% oral presentations). If oral presentations are used, the FI will provide a copy of the evaluation, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations to the students.

(2) Practicum. A practicum is a course of study designed for the supervised practical application of previously studied theory. The TSC practicum will explore the characteristics of hypothetical current and future issues or conflicts, which allows participants the opportunity to consider and discuss strategic and operational concepts in a realistic situation. Students will develop solutions and build upon them to arrive at

seminar consensus. Written and oral responses will be required as products from the exercises and comprise 20% of the overall evaluation.

d. Oral Requirements. Students will routinely prepare and present short oral presentations to their respective seminars. Oral presentations will be evaluated by the Faculty Instructor in accordance with the AY2018 Communicative Arts Directive and included in the “contribution” section of the final course evaluation. Execution of oral presentations are at the discretion of the Faculty Instructor, but if used they will be evaluated as a maximum of 10% of the overall course evaluation. Students will be notified in advance of graded oral requirements. The Faculty Instructor will provide a copy of the evaluation to the students, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations.

4. Additional Student Requirement. Faculty Instructors may designate individual or group projects for presentation to the seminar.

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Course Overview

Block I – Strategic Planning

- TSC-01: (28 Nov) TSC Course Introduction and Environment of the Combatant Commander (3 hrs)
- TSC-02: (29 Nov) Strategic Direction (3 hrs)
- TSC-03: (30 Nov) Operational Art and Design (3 hrs)
- TSC-04: (1 Dec) The Elements of Operational Design (3 hrs)
- TSC-05: (4 Dec) Theater Strategy (3 hrs)
- TSC-06: (5 Dec) Campaign Plans and Military Options (3 hrs)
- TSC-07-08: (7-8 Dec) Operational Design Practicum (6 hrs)

Block II – Military Power Applied

- TSC-09: (11 Dec) Joint Warfare: Today and Tomorrow (3 hrs)
- TSC-10: (12 Dec) U.S. Army and U.S. Navy (3 hrs)
- TSC-11: (14 Dec) U.S. Air Force Space (3 hrs)
- TSC-12: (15 Dec) Marines, Special Operations Forces, Coast Guard (3 hrs)
- TSC-13: (18 Dec) Cyberspace (3 hrs)
- TSC-14: (19 Dec) Landpower and Joint Operations (3 hrs)

Block III – Unified Action

- TSC-15: (4 Jan) Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (3 hrs)
- TSC-16: (8 Jan) Unified Action (3 hrs)
- TSC-17: (10 Jan) Interagency Coordination In Theater(3 hrs)
- TSC-18: (17 Jan) Multinational Operations (3 hrs)

Block IV – Campaign Analysis

- TSC-19: (19 Jan) The Joint Planning Process: Getting In (Principles of Joint Planning) (3hrs)
- TSC-20: (22 Jan) Intelligence; Command and Control (3 hrs)
- TSC-21: (26 Jan) Movement and Maneuver, and Fires (3 hrs)
- TSC-22: (30 Jan) Sustainment and Operational Contracting Support (3 hrs)
- TSC-23: (2 Feb) Protection and Information (3 hrs)
- TSC-24: (5 Feb) The Joint Planning Process: JPP II & Transition (IFOR to SFOR) (3 hrs)

Block V – Tying it All Together

- TSC-25-32: (6-9 Feb) Experiential Learning Event (Operational Design EX and Brief) (24 hrs)
- TSC-33: (12 Feb) Course Synthesis and End of Course AAR (3 hrs)

November 2017

10

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
			1	2	3	4
5 DST ENDS	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21 NSPS ENDS 1300 Recess	22-25 Fall Recess			
26 Fall Recess	27 RWR	28 TSC-01 Intro & The Combatant Commander	29 TSC-02 Strategic Direction <i>NLT: Opt Art</i> <i>NMS Lect: US only</i>	30 TSC-03 Using Op Art		

December 2017

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
					1 TSC-04 Op Design Theory	2 <i>Christkindlesmarkt</i>
3	4 TSC-05 Theater Strat <i>ADM Rogers</i>	5 TSC-06 Campaign Plans & Military Options <i>NTL: Navy 101</i> <i>Student F'ball</i>	6 RWR	7 TSC-07 Op Design Practicum I <i>NTL: AF 101</i> <i>Qts 1 Reception</i>	8 TSC-08 Op Design Practicum II <i>NTL: Army 101</i> <i>NG Birthday</i>	9 <i>Army-Navy Game</i>
10	11 TSC-09 Joint Warfare: Today & Tomorrow <i>ADM Tidd</i>	12 TSC-10 U.S. Army & U.S. Navy <i>NTL: Marines 101</i>	13 SRP 6	14 TSC-11 U.S. Air Force & Space <i>NTL: SOF 101</i>	15 TSC-12 Marines SOF, Coast Guard <i>NTL: Cyber 101</i>	16
17	18 TSC-13 Cyberspace	19 TSC-14 <i>Landpower and Joint Ops</i> 1300 Recess	20	21	22	23
Winter Recess						
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Winter Recess						
31	Winter Recess					

11

January 2018

12

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	1 Winter Recess	2	3 RSP Begins RSP 1	4 TSC-15 Homeland Defense & DSCA <i>NTL: DSCA/HD</i>	5 RSP 2	6
7	8 TSC-16 Unified Action	9 <i>NTL: UNCLOS</i> RSP 3	10 TSC-17 Interagency Coordination in Theater	11 RSP 4	12 RWR	13
14	15 MLK Holiday	16 RSP 5	17 TSC-18 Multi-National Ops <i>Short Paper DUE</i>	18 RSP 6	19 TSC-19 JPP I	20
21	22 TSC-20 Intelligence; Command and Control <i>Gen McDew</i>	23 RSP 7	24 SRP 7	25 RSP 8	26 TSC-21 Movement & Maneuvers, and Fires <i>Chili Cook-Off</i>	27
28	29 RSP 9	30 TSC-22 Sustainment and Operational Contracting Support	31 <i>RSP Paper DUE</i> RWR			

February 2018

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
				1 RSP ENDS RSP 10	2 TSC-23 Protection and Information	3
4	5 TSC-24 JPP II Transition IFOR to SFOR <i>Long Paper DUE</i>	6 TSC-25 OP DESIGN I TSC-26 OP DESIGN II	7 TSC-27 OP DESIGN III TSC-28 OP DESIGN IV	8 TSC-29 OP DESIGN V TSC-30 OP DESIGN VI	9 TSC-31 OP DESIGN VII TSC-32 OP DESIGN Brief	10
11	12 TSC-33 Course Synthesis & AAR <i>TSC Ends</i>	13 DM Begins	14	15	16	17
18	19 Washington's Birthday Holiday	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28			

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Block I Intent “Strategic Planning”

Block Chief: Prof Al Lord

Purpose: Introduce the Theater Strategy and Campaigning course. Analyze the global and regional roles of the combatant commanders in the execution of national security policy. Synthesize the concept of operational art as it is applied in the formulation and execution of theater campaign planning, execution, and assessment. Introduce the new Integrated Planning Framework, and evaluate the concept of military options. Enable the students to understand and apply operational art and operational design and to demonstrate the value of design methodology as a way to create military options that will inform security policy and follow-on joint planning.

Method: Leveraging previous instruction from the ISS, TWS, SL, and especially the NSPS course, facilitate applicable lessons to achieve the block purpose. Use the Unified Command Plan to describe the roles and missions of the combatant commanders. Describe operational art and review the lexicon as it pertains to the strategic level. Discuss the latest developments in integrated planning and the concept of military options. Use design methodology to describe a likely approach to a hypothetical security problem.

End state: At the end of the block students should understand the purpose and requirements of the TSC course, have analyzed the roles and authorities of the combatant commanders, and have a working knowledge of operational art, the use of the design methodology, the new Integrated Planning Framework and military options.

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TSC COURSE INTRODUCTION & ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-01-S

1. Introduction.

a. Theater Strategy and Campaigning Course (TSC) Introduction. During the first hour, the Faculty Instructor (FI) will introduce TSC. Key points to cover will be the course outcomes, linkages to other courses, schedule, sequence of lessons, expected outcomes, course requirements, and student assessments. The FI will also introduce the students to the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) (<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>) and Joint Doctrine, Education & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) for access to joint publications (<https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0>). NOTE: A DOD Common Access Card (CAC) is required to access the JDEIS site.

b. Environment of the Combatant Commander.

(1) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) directs the establishment of the combatant commands (CCMD) as provided in the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the United States Code (USC). Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) receive strategic direction from the President and Secretary of Defense through a variety of formal and informal methods (to be covered in TSC-02) and are responsible for planning and executing operations to achieve U.S. strategic ends. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are the senior Department of Defense representatives in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). Functional combatant commanders (FCCs) provide support across all regions. CCDRs must accurately understand their environment and problems they face or will face, then fashion an adaptable strategy that meets current challenges while preparing for future threats, challenges, and opportunities. This strategy must be flexible enough to prevent threats and challenges from arising when possible, mitigate threats when necessary, and take advantage of opportunities that might be “hidden” within the larger dynamic strategic environment. Therefore, before we undertake operational design and joint planning, we must first understand the nature and characteristics of the contemporary – and evolving – environment of the CCDR.

(2) This lesson will examine the nature and characteristics of the CCDR’s environment. Its purpose is to assist you in framing the scope and complexity of the challenges and opportunities inherent in the evolving 21st Century environment and their impact on the CCDR’s ability to understand, envision, prioritize, and plan to meet current, as well as future, challenges and opportunities while managing risk and time.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Evaluate** difficulties combatant commanders face in envisioning, understanding, and prioritizing challenges and opportunities in complex environments while managing risk.

b. **Analyze** the nature, character, and characteristics of the evolving contemporary environment facing combatant commanders when developing and executing military strategy for their geographic regions or global responsibilities.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** and be prepared to discuss the roles and responsibilities of the CCDR in the formulation, articulation, translation, dissemination, and implementation of strategic direction.

b. **Comprehend** the role of the combatant commander in influencing long-term processes such as research and development, acquisition, and global posture and basing.

c. **Know** the six Geographic Combatant Commands' (GCC) Areas of Responsibility (AORs) and at least three responsibilities common to all GCCs.

d. **Know** the four Functional Combatant Commands (FCC) and at least one responsibility unique to each FCC.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points to consider in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Cynthia Watson, *Combatant Commands* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, June 8, 2010), <http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?d=/books/gpg/E1380C/E1380C-48.xml> (accessed July 28, 2017). Read Introduction and Origins of the Geographic Combatant Command System, pp. 2-20. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) President of the United States (POTUS), *Unified Command Plan* (April 6, 2011 with Change-1 dated 12 September 2011); For Official Use Only (FOUO). Read pp. 1-4, scan remainder. **[DMSPO Student Issue]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. III-7 to III-12. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) Daniel R. Coats, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community made to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., May 11, 2017, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf> (accessed October 13, 2017). Read pp. 1-15. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(5) US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operating Environment 2035* (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 28, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joe/joe_2035_july16.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). Read “Executive Summary” and pp. 5-9. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Global Trends* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, July 28, 2017), <https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/documents/GT-Letter-and-Summary.pdf> (accessed July 24, 2017). Read The Future Summarized. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Andrew Feickert, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013), <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA590332> (accessed July 25, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Michael O’Hanlon, “Do U.S. Military Commands Really Need Reorganizing?” *Brookings*, entry posted January 5, 2016, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/01/05-do-us-military-commands-need-reorganizing-ohanlon> (accessed July 28, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) *Title 10, United States Code*, Chapter 6 – Combatant Commands (August 10, 1956), <http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10/subtitleA/part1/chapter6&edition=prelim> (accessed June 23, 2016). Read sections 161-167. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What role do combatant commanders have regarding national security and policy? What are the associated responsibilities and authorities and where do they come from?

b. What are the predominant characteristics of the contemporary and evolving operational environment and their impact on CCDRs’ ability to shape their AORs on terms favorable to national interests while managing risk?

c. What are the implications of an “over focus” of Joint Force capabilities on any one region of the conflict continuum? What are the associated impacts on long-term processes such as research and development, acquisition, and global posture and basing in an increasingly resource-constrained environment?

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-02-S

1. Introduction.

a. The *National Security Policy and Strategy* (NSPS) course introduced national-level policy and strategy formulation. This lesson is a “bridge” from that national-level focus to the theater-level focus of the combatant commander (CCDR) in the Theater Strategy and Campaigning (TSC) course. Joint planning and design must account for the strategic ends contained in strategic guidance documents and ensure that campaigns are consistent with national priorities and appropriate for the achievement of national security objectives derived from the available strategic direction whether formal or informal. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines strategic guidance as:

The written products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic direction.

b. Combatant commanders receive strategic guidance both formally and informally. Examples of formal strategic direction include the Unified Command Plan (UCP), National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (aka National Defense Strategy in NDAA FY2017), National Military Strategy (NMS), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (will be renamed the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan in the new JSCP), Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMI), and Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The President of the United States (POTUS) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) may also provide strategic direction to CCDRs informally in Presidential Directives, policy speeches, press conferences, public statements, other written guidance, and personal interaction with CCDRs. Some of this informal guidance may amend or cancel formal strategic direction.

c. CCDRs and staffs also monitor a variety of “strategic influencers” to anticipate changes to strategic direction. These influencers include the media, think tanks, interest groups, and public opinion. Although they do not provide strategic direction, they can influence policy and subsequent strategic direction. In many cases these influencers have a bearing on the CCDR’s interpretation and application of strategic guidance and inform their judgment and interaction with POTUS and the SECDEF.

d. This lesson examines the formulation, articulation, dissemination, and interpretation of strategic direction. It will examine the relationships between various strategic direction products and the management of national military resources. These topics contribute to the foundation of Theater Strategy and Campaigning.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the doctrinal process and procedures by which Combatant Commanders receive strategic guidance and the relationships between the various strategic documents (UCP, NSS, QDR/NDS, NMS, GEF, DPG, JSCP, GFMIG, and GFMAP).

b. **Evaluate** how the National Military Strategy and the Global Integration concept influences how Combatant Commanders view their environment through a transregional, multi-domain and multi-functional lens and how it guides their inter-relationship with the rest of the Joint Force to achieve U.S. national interests globally.

c. **Evaluate** how strategic documents influence the Global Force Management process and how Combatant Commanders use this process to receive forces required to accomplish assigned tasks.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Know** the party responsible and purpose for the following strategic direction documents: UCP, NSS, QDR/NDS, NMS, GEF, DPG, JSCP, GFMIG, and GFMAP.

b. **Understand** the global integration concept expressed in the National Military Strategy.

c. **Know** the definition of Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings; refer frequently to learning outcomes, enabling outcomes, and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various strategic direction documents.

b. Required Readings (in order).

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf (accessed July 25, 2017). Read Chapter II, "Strategic Guidance and Coordination," pages II-1 to II-8, paras. 1 to 8 and Appendix E, "Global Force Management." **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018). Read Chapter 1, “National Strategic Direction and Guidance,” pp. 3-20 and Chapter 2, “Joint Planning” section 6. Integrated Planning Framework on pp. 33-35. **[Student Issue] [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2016*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015). Read CJCS Forward to NMS. **[Blackboard]**

(4) Defense Video Imagery Distribution System, “Dunford Speaks at Air Force Association Conference,” September 2, 2016, *DVIDS*, video file, <https://www.dvidshub.net/video/484212/dunford-speaks-air-force-association-conference> (accessed July 26, 2017). View from 30:18 – 36:54. **[Open Source URL]**

(5) *Title 10, United States Code*, Public Law 1028, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., August 10, 1956, <http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section153&num=0&edition=prelim> (accessed July 28, 2017). **Read** section 153 (focus on a3, Global Integration, b. NMS, and c. Annual Report on CCDR Requirements). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) William Eliason, “An Interview with Kurt W. Tidd,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 83 (3rd Quarter 2017), <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-86/Article/1219086/an-interview-with-kurt-w-tidd/> (accessed July 24, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. II-1 to II-7, paragraphs 1 & 2. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed July 26, 2017). Scan pp. 1-14. **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Charles T. Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). Scan Secretary’s cover letter and the Executive Summary (pp. III-XV). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Charles T. Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). Read “Chairman’s Assessment,” pp. 59-64. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the key differences between strategic direction and operational or tactical orders or guidance?

b. What are the four major themes in the NMS that will affect how Combatant Commanders view their regional or global responsibilities? What are the implications and impacts on how they interact with other members of the Joint Force, other government agencies, allies and partners?

c. How does the CJCS, as a global integrator, play a role in the formulation, dissemination, and revision of strategic direction?

d. Why is the NMS classified? What are the advantages and disadvantages of that decision?

e. How do the NMS concepts of Global Integration and TMM affect the current UCP construct of regional Combatant Commands? Is the current construct still relevant in the current and future operating environment? Why or why not?

f. How do assigned, allocated, and apportioned forces influence Combatant Commanders’ plans? Does Global Force Management enable or constrain Combatant Commanders? Why?

OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-03-S

Coup d'oeil . . . is the rapid discovery of a truth which to the ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so after long examination and reflection.
–Carl von Clausewitz, 1832

The essential task of operational art [is] mediating between abstract conception and concrete action.

–Huba Wass de Czege, 2011

1. Introduction. General George Patton wrote, “For years I have been accused of indulging in snap judgments. Honestly this is not the case because . . . I am a profound military student and the thoughts I express . . . are the result of years of thought and study.”¹ Patton’s innate ability to appreciate and exploit the military possibilities in a theater of operations arose from his mastery of operational art to act on his *coup d’oeil* (“glance,” in French). William Duggan terms this “strategic intuition”:

The selective projection of past elements into the future in a new combination as a course of action that might or might not fit your previous goals, with the personal commitment to follow through and work out the details along the way.²

This lesson discusses operational art and its complement, operational design, as the instruments used by commanders to translate their *coup d’oeil* into objectives and actions. Joint Publication 5-0 *Joint Planning* defines three related concepts (page IV-1) for this lesson.

a. *Operational art* is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is inherent in all aspects of operational design.

b. *Operational design* is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or operation and its subsequent execution. The framework is built upon an iterative process that creates a shared understanding of the operational environment (OE); identifies and frames problems within that OE; and develops

¹ William Duggan, “*Coup d’Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning*” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 5.

² *Ibid.*, 4.

approaches, through the application of operational art, to resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance and/or policy.

c. The *operational approach* broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the end state. It allows the commander to continue the Joint Planning Process, translating broad strategic and operational concepts into specific missions and tasks to produce an executable plan.




Figure IV-2. Operational Art
(JP 5-0, 16 June 2017)

d. You read the joint definition of operational art earlier. The Army defines it as “the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose” (ADRP 3-0, 2016). Such a pursuit commonly occurs within a *campaign* planned and executed by the theater commander. Joint doctrine (JP 3-0) states that campaigns occur at the *operational level of war*. However, military scholars do not always agree that operational art is restricted to a particular level of war. Furthermore, is operational art only practiced by commanders of land forces?

e. The Army War College *Campaign Planning Handbook* states that operational design provides an organized way to think through the complexity of the environment and the ill-structured problems that may require the use of force. You learned about such problems as complex, adaptive systems during *Strategic Leadership*. Is operational design a concept invented by the military? Wong and Wujec give valuable perspectives on ill-structured, complex problems, and the concepts of “design” and “design thinking” that have evolved to address them in the design and engineering professions. They also provide useful tips to consider during your own work in a planning group.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Describe** how commanders use operational art to provide the vision that links tactical actions to strategic objectives.

b. **Analyze** the concept of operational design as a way of thinking to carry out operational art.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the nature of an ill-structured (“wicked”) problem.

b. **Understand** that a campaign comprises a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook Academic Year 2018* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2018). Read Chapter 3, “Operational Design,” pp. 45-79. **[DMSPO Student Issue]**
[Blackboard]

Bruscino’s paper refers to the Army’s concept of *unified land operations* published in 2011 as Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 *Operations*. ADP 3-0 was updated in 2016 with some changes in terminology, but his explanation of the relationship between operational art and the Army’s operational concept is still valid today.

(2) Thomas Bruscino, “SAMS Theoretical Paper: The Theory of Operational Art and Unified Land Operations” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012). Read pp. 2–16 and 22 (Conclusion). **[Blackboard]**

Two short pieces from faculty members at King’s College, London, explore the relationship between—and the relevance of—the operational level of war and operational art.

(3) Stuart Griffin, “Operational Art and the Operational Level: The Case for the Defence,” *Defence-in-Depth*, September 16, 2015, <https://defenceindepth.co/2015/09/16/operational-art-and-the-operational-level-the-case-for-the-defence/> (accessed September 11, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

Benbow remarks that the debate over operational art “feel[s] like the land component talking to itself.”

(4) Tim Benbow, “The Operational Level of War and Maritime Forces,” *Defence-in-Depth*, February 23, 2017, <https://defenceindepth.co/2017/02/23/the-operational-level-of-war-and-maritime-forces/> (accessed September 11, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Nathan A. Jennings, "Washington: The First Operational Artist, By George," *ARMY* 67, no. 8 (August 2017) [ProQuest](#) (accessed August 22, 2017). Read pp. 47-50. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

Remember the ten characteristics of a wicked problem from Wong's article, and look for parallels between the "design thinking process" and our framework of operational design.

(6) Euphemia Wong, "5 Steps to Help You Tackle Wicked Problems by Combining Systems Thinking with Agile Methodology," Interaction Design Foundation, April 24, 2017, <https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/wicked-problems-5-steps-to-help-you-tackle-wicked-problems-by-combining-systems-thinking-with-agile-methodology> (accessed July 24, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

Wujec advocates for a node-and-link systems model to capture the diverse perspectives within a planning team. Note his advice on the optimal number of nodes for effective analysis.

(7) Tom Wujec, "Got a Wicked Problem? First, Tell Me How You Make Toast," February 5, 2015, *TED, YouTube*, streaming video, 9:05, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vS_b7cJn2A (accessed July 28, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

b. Focused Readings. None.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Brad Hardy, "Striking a Balance between Operational Art and Operational Craftsmanship," *Task and Purpose*, November 3, 2015, <http://taskandpurpose.com/striking-a-balance-between-operational-art-and-operational-craftsmanship/> (accessed July 24, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Michael R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art" (n.d.), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/modern_operations.pdf (accessed July 13, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Huba Wass de Czege, "Operational Art: Continually Making Two Kinds of Choices in Harmony While Learning and Adapting," *ARMY* 61, no. 9 (September 2011), [ProQuest](#) (accessed July 25, 2017). **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

Eikmeier's videos are based on the previous edition of JP 5-0, published in August 2011. There may be some difference in terminology; however, some students may benefit from his narrative description of operational art and operational design.

(4) Dale Eikmeier, “Operational Art, Design and the Center of Gravity, Part 1 of 4,” October 13, 2015, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College YouTube Channel*, streaming video, 11:19, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBStKk3fE4E> (accessed July 13, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Dale Eikmeier, “Operational Art, Design, and the Center of Gravity, Part 2 of 4,” October 13, 2015, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College YouTube Channel*, streaming video, 12:56, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h7poQ87Nf0A> (accessed July 13, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Rikke Dam and Teo Siang, “Stage 2 in the Design Thinking Process: Define the Problem and Interpret the Results,” *Interaction Design Foundation*, August 20, 2017, <https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/stage-2-in-the-design-thinking-process-define-the-problem-and-interpret-the-results> (accessed September 14, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. Do you think it is useful to link operational art with the operational [theater] level of war? Why or why not? Can any commander exercise operational art, or only those who display Clausewitz’s “military genius”? Explain.

b. Bruscano warns, “Only such a full grasp of the strategic context [policy objectives and theater conditions] allows operational artists to determine risk, and thus what is possible in the pursuit of the strategic objective” (p. 4). Contrast operational art as practiced by General George Washington with that of General William Howe.

c. The 2016 *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035* defines the future security environment through two “overarching challenges—contested norms and persistent disorder.” How would you characterize the operational art required today to address these challenges?

d. How would you characterize operational design’s relationship to operational art?

e. What parallels do you see between design thinking and operational design?

f. What conditions prompt us to employ operational design instead of the Military Decisionmaking Process?

g. What are some questions that operational design should reveal in the current and future operational environments?

h. What are some issues that may arise during the work to define the problem?

i. What choices must the design team make when they identify potential undesired effects on the environment caused by the proposed operational approach?

THE ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-04-S

1. Introduction.

a. Recall from TSC-03 that operational design is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art; it provides a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns. Operational design results in the commander's operational approach, which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the end state.

b. The *elements of operational design* can best be thought of as the language of the operational approach and will be essential in the structured planning of the Joint Planning Process.



Figure IV-7. Elements of Operational Design
(JP 5-0, 16 June 2017)

c. This lesson employs a historical case study. The 1943 Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) showcases the application of the elements of operational design by commanders—and many instances where they were ignored.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Understand** the enduring nature of the elements of operational design.

b. **Illustrate** the employment of the elements of operational design.

3. Enabling Outcome. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook Academic Year 2018* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2018). Review “Develop an Operational Approach,” pp. 64-72. **[DMSPO Student Issue]**
[Blackboard]

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 2017),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf (accessed July 24, 2017). Read pp. IV-31 to IV-33 “Defeat and Stability Mechanisms” and pp. IV36-IV-42, “Arranging Operations” through “Phasing.” **[Open Source URL]** **[Blackboard]**

(3) *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*, “Sicily,” Pub 72-16 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History). Read pp. 3-27.
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-16/CMH_Pub_72-16.pdf (accessed July 24, 2017). **[Open Source URL]** **[Blackboard]**

b. Focused Readings. None.

c. Suggested Readings.

The DMSPO case study for Operation HUSKY may provide additional insights regarding use of the elements of operational design by the Allied and Axis commanders.

(1) Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, Case Study: “Operation Husky—The Campaign in Sicily” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 10 April 2006). **[Blackboard]**

(2) James Stultz and Michael Buchanan, “A New Theory to Avoid Operational Level Stagnation,” *Army Press Online Journal* (April 1, 2016),
<http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/16-14-Stultz-and-Buchanan-1Apr161.pdf> (accessed July 24, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Adam Elkus, “A Critical Perspective on Operational Art and Design Theory,” *Small Wars Journal* Online (April 30, 2012), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-critical-perspective-on-operational-art-and-design-theory> (accessed July 24, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Department of the Army, *Army Design Methodology*, ATP 5-0.1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 1, 2015),
http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp5_0x1.pdf (accessed July 28, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

Eikmeier's videos are based on the previous edition of JP 5-0, published in 2011. There may be differences in terminology with the current JP 5-0; however, some students may benefit from his narrative description of determining the center of gravity.

(5) Dale Eikmeier, "Operational Art, Design, and the Center of Gravity, Part 3 of 4," October 13, 2015, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College YouTube Channel*, streaming video, 11:26, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WnmVlybFG0> (accessed July 13, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Dale Eikmeier, "Operational Art, Design, and the Center of Gravity, Part 4 of 4," October 13, 2015, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College YouTube Channel*, streaming video, 15:42, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-RYbtyzfB1w> (accessed July 13, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

- a. Why do you think the elements of operational design (art) are enduring? How would you change any of them to be more useful in warfare today?
- b. What is the relationship between end state, termination criteria, and objectives?
- c. What is an effect? How can a description of desired and undesired effects assist in linking objectives to activities?
- d. What is a center of gravity (COG)?
- e. How can an analysis of a COG, through describing its critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR), and critical vulnerabilities (CV), help the commander and staff formulate approaches to solving a problem?
- f. What is a decisive point? How can one develop potential decisive points?
- g. What are lines of effort? How do they differ from lines of operation?
- h. What is the relationship between a COG, decisive points, and lines of operation/lines of effort?

THEATER STRATEGY

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-05-S

1. Introduction.

a. Geographic combatant commanders translate national policy and strategy into theater strategy and theater campaign plans. Functional combatant commanders must also translate national policy/strategy into functional strategy for specified global problems and develop those strategies into global campaign plans. The combatant command theater strategy is the combatant commander's way to put national strategic guidance into a regional context. In it, the commander describes the environment, the challenges and an approach toward advancing U.S. national interests. The theater strategy is important in the hierarchy of guidance documents. The various national strategies provide 10-30 year goals, broad interests, and conceptual ways. The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), signed by the SECDEF, provides specific direction to address specific problem sets in the 3-5 year horizon. Theater strategies must balance the need to look more broadly, conceptually and deeper temporally than the GEF while also bringing national strategic guidance into their regions in a way that provides guidance to planners and subordinate commanders -- who have to turn concepts into actual operations, actions and activities.

b. In the first part of today's lesson we will discuss how a combatant commander translates national strategic direction into a theater strategy and then into supporting strategies and plans. We will discuss the linkages between the NSS, NMS, GEF, JSCP, PPDs, speeches, and other relevant sources of guidance. We will look at the balance of military art and planning science that goes into these documents and what balance theater strategies strike.

c. We will consider actual combatant commander theater strategies and evaluate their ability to provide the commander's vision, purpose, mission, and priorities to supporting and subordinate commanders, allies and partners, and the interagency. Some CCDRs choose to publish a classified theater strategy. In those cases, their annual posture statements and testimony to congress is sufficient to determine their strategic assessment, priorities, and guidance.

d. An essential element of the theater strategy is theater security cooperation with allies and partners in the region. We will examine how the combatant commander builds partner capacity to provide a strong foundation for multinational teamwork.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Synthesize** national direction as articulated in the NSS, NMS, GEF and other sources with the strategic environment of the combatant commander.

b. **Evaluate** a theater strategy as the vehicle by which a combatant commander provides direction and context to supporting and subordinate commanders, allies and partners, and the interagency.

c. **Analyze** the challenge of building partner security capacity.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points to consider in seminar. Select a geographic combatant commander and analyze the guidance provided via the applicable theater strategy or similar direction.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSM 3130.01A, *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 25, 2014), <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/m313001.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175658-163> (accessed July 24, 2017). Read Enclosures A, B and C. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 2017), http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf (accessed 24 July 2017). Read pp. II-6 (para 8) through II-11 (para 10) and III-1 – III-5 (para 1). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018). Review pp. 17-20 of Chapter 1 “National Strategic Direction and Guidance.” **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard]**

(4) William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making, *Parameters* 45, no.3 (Autumn 2015), [Proquest](#) (accessed August 29, 2016). Scan pp. 13-18. Read pp. 19-26. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(5) Taylor White, “Security Cooperation: How it All Fits,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 72, (First Quarter 2014), [Proquest](#) (accessed 24 July 2017). **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Curtis M. Scaparrotti, *United States European Command: Theater Strategy* (United States European Command, February 2017). **[Blackboard]**

(2) Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Memorandum, February 2017. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Harry B. Harris, Jr., *United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Guidance* (Camp Smith, HI: United States Pacific Command, August 12, 2016). **[Blackboard]**

(4) United States Pacific Command, "USPACOM Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Camp Smith Hawaii: United States Pacific Command, April 10, 2017. **[Blackboard]**

(5) Joseph L. Votel, *United States Central Command Theater Strategy* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States Central Command, November 22, 2016). **[Blackboard]**

(6) Lori J. Robinson, U.S. Air Force, *Statement of General Lori J. Robinson, United States Air Force Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command: USNORTHCOM and NORAD Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., April 6, 2017. **[Blackboard]**

(7) K.W. Kidd, *United States Southern Command 2017-2027 Theater Strategy* (Miami, FL: United States Southern Command, April 4, 2017). **[Blackboard]**

(8) Thomas D. Waldhauser, *General Thomas D. Waldhauser, Commander, U.S. Africa Command: Prepared Opening Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., March 9, 2017. **[Blackboard]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, *Security Force Assistance Planner's Guide* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1, 2016). Read pp. 1-1 – 1-5.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does theater strategy relate to national strategy and military strategy?

b. How does the CCDR translate national level strategy and direction plus operational level guidance and direction into a theater strategy?

c. How does the CCDR integrate interagency and multi-national activities into the Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan?

d. What are the intended audiences for the Theater Strategy and how does that impact how it is written?

e. What is security cooperation and what are some types of associated activities?

CAMPAIGN PLANS AND MILITARY OPTIONS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-06-S

1. Introduction.

a. The United States armed forces are active around the world, forward deployed and postured to protect national interests and fulfill defense treaty responsibilities. The joint force executes strategy and maintains unity of effort by synchronizing multiple activities into a campaign to achieve a common political objective. Geographic combatant commanders and functional combatant commanders are directed in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) to develop plans for specific contingencies as branches to their theater campaign plan or functional campaign plan. In addition combatant commanders will develop subordinate plans to support DOD global campaign plans. These contingency plans are executed during a situation that cannot be adequately addressed by the campaign's everyday (steady state) actions.

b. In accordance with the National Military Strategy and other strategic guidance, joint planning integrates military actions across combatant commands and the joint force, with other instruments of national power, and allies and partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve goals and objectives. Joint operation planning focuses on two types of planning: deliberate planning and crisis planning. Both use the Joint Planning Process (JPP) and relate equally to operational design. Deliberate planning occurs in non-crisis situations. It produces theater and functional campaign plans (TCP/FCP) that are the basis for execution of theater strategies, and contingency plans that are branches to the TCP/FCP, along with supporting plans of various types. Planning done in response to an emergency or crisis follows a similar process on a reduced timeline

c. A major function of the combatant commander is to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the "best military advice" to the President and Secretary of Defense. According to JP 5-0 Joint Planning, contingency plans should provide a range of military options, to include flexible deterrent options (FDOs) or flexible response options (FROs), that are coordinated with the total U.S. government response. They provide a wide range of actions that are bounded by the range of political objectives contained in the original contingency planning guidance. However, when an unforeseen crisis emerges, civilian leaders often have not decided yet which policy objectives to pursue and ask military leaders for options. The purpose of the military advice they seek in this situation is not about which course of military action to approve, but the policy objectives the military instrument of power can enable. Options developed to inform policy decisions during a crisis require a different model than those developed as part of contingency planning.

d. The foundation of this lesson is doctrinal in nature. Additional readings provide thought pieces that get to the tensions involved with providing the best military advice over time and in crisis situations. Building on previous instruction in prior core courses, we must understand how the political context of a situation impacts the development of military options and contingency plans, the friction points between civilian and military leaders during the production of military options and contingency plans, and will help you identify what an advisor to senior military leaders should consider when developing "best military advice" to senior civilian leaders during an emerging crisis.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Evaluate** how combatant command level theater and functional campaign plans anticipate and respond to uncertainty, surprise, and emerging conditions.

b. **Evaluate** the development of military options that support national decision making and strategic goals.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Understand** the difference between courses of action and military options.

b. **Comprehend** the iterative nature of policy, strategy, options, and contingency plan development.

c. **Comprehend** the sources of friction between military and civilian decision makers during the development of policy objectives.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points to consider in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-0 *Joint Planning*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 2017), http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf (accessed July 25, 2017). Read pp. III-5 (para 2) - III-16, and Appendix F. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018). Read pp. 20-26 Chapter 1 "National Strategic Direction and Guidance" and pp. 27-43 Chapter 2 "Joint Planning." **[DMSP Student Issue] [Blackboard]**

(3) Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Read pp. 217-220 and 248-251. **[USAWC Library Issued Text]**

(4) Meir Finkel, *On Flexibility, Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011). Read pp. 223-225. **[Blackboard]**

(5) Richard D. Hooker, Jr., Joseph J. Collins, eds., *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, September 1, 2015), <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/lessons-encountered/lessons-encountered.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2017). Read pp. 410-416. **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2013, http://thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/dempsey.pdf (accessed July 25, 2017). Addresses options for the use of force in the Syrian Conflict. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

c. Focused Reading. None

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). Read pp. 109-120 and 338-347.

(2) Boone J. Bartholomees, "Theory of Victory," *Parameters* 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008). Read pp. 25-36.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does the theater strategy and the theater campaign plan lay the groundwork for contingency plans?

b. What is the utility of deliberate planning, given that we have rarely executed a prepared contingency plan?

c. How does the political context impact the development of military options and contingency plans?

d. What are the friction points between civilian and military leaders during the production of military options and contingency plans?

e. What should an advisor to senior military leaders consider when developing "best military advice" to senior civilian leaders during an emerging crisis?

7 December 2017 (0830-1130)
8 December 2017 (0830-1130)

Lesson Author: Prof Al Lord (245-4858)

OPERATIONAL DESIGN PRACTICUM

Mode: Exercise

Lesson: TSC-07 and TSC-08-EX

1. Introduction. This is a two-day (6-hour) instructor facilitated exercise designed to enable students to use the design methodology to create military options for policy makers. The scenario is a hypothetical regional contingency and the options will eventually inform the Joint Planning Process. As presented in JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*:

“The purpose of operational design is used in conjunction with operational art to produce an operational approach that will allow the commander to continue the joint planning process, translating broad strategic and operational concepts into specific missions and tasks and produce an executable plan.”

The thinking that is used in operational design can also effectively be used at the strategic level to create options for national policy makers.

To conduct this exercise, students will actively participate in the design process led by their faculty instructor. They will play as members of a Geographic CCDR staff and use the design methodology to develop military options (as described in lesson TSC-06) that will ultimately inform the follow-on TSC exercise in Block V. Students will succeed by understanding the environment, defining the problem, and developing an approach in the form of military options that will achieve the desired conditions for the U.S. and key regional allies and partners.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Synthesize** the role and perspective of the combatant commander in developing military options via the design methodology given a hypothetical regional scenario.

b. **Evaluate** the design methodology as it applies to providing military options given a hypothetical regional scenario.

c. **Evaluate** the products of the design methodology (military options) as a way to inform national policy makers and the joint planning process.

d. **Evaluate** the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) The first part of this exercise will require familiarity with a hypothetical regional contingency. The TSC Southeast Asia Scenario will be used and the students should understand the strategic environment to include interests of regional actors and major factors that are likely to determine the future of the region.

(2) Students will work through the design methodology to provide military options. There is no right format for the end product or brief. Groups are encouraged to use creative and critical thinking to provide the results in accordance with FI direction.

(3) Based on the TSC Southeast Asia Scenario, seminars will work to analyze the environment, assess strategic guidance provided (if any), and describe the desired outcomes for the region and the corresponding conditions that will enable those outcomes. Students should project the current environment into the future (that set of conditions likely to exist if the current trends continue), identify the competing objectives of other actors, and identify tensions and opportunities presented by the synthesis of desired outcomes and conditions with those of other actors. Students should possess a basic understanding by reading the scenario prior to meeting in seminar for the exercise. To define the problem, students will need to define a strategic horizon, explore key trends in the region, recognize developing threats to U.S. and partner interests, and evaluate tensions, forces, and opportunities among the various competing sets of desired conditions. The seminar will then work to conceptualize and describe a broad approach that will achieve the strategic guidance. As the possible approaches are explored, it is likely that more questions and insights about the environment will arise, desired outcomes and conditions may need to be redefined, and the definition of the problem may evolve. Once an approach to solve the problem emerges, the group will describe the approach in a logical way. The group will also assess the effects of the approach on the environment to determine areas of risk and anticipate and mitigate unintended negative effects. Elements of operational design such as objectives, effects, decisive points, and lines of effort may help in explaining the approach.

(4) Students will understand how to brief their results. Though no template or format is provided for the brief, but consistent with instruction and joint doctrine, development of military options should include the following elements:

Military Options

- Understanding of the operational environment - A description of the most important aspects of the environment along with desired theater outcomes and their linkage to national interests and goals or objectives.
- Definition of the problem(s) – this should include the desired ends compared to evident or likely trends that would result in undesired outcomes.
- Description of the approach (military option) - explains how resources will be applied within a timeframe for expected outcomes.

- Policy Outcome
- Activity (verb)
- Military objectives
- Military endstate
- Risk
- Time
- Means

b. Required Readings.

(1) Read: U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operation, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018). Read: SecDef Snowflake to CJCS dated 6 Dec 2024; Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) pp. 1-8; Southeast Asia Security Assessment pp. 29-83. Scan: USPACOM Strategic Guidance pp. 9-13; USPACOM Theater Plan, pp. 15-28; Department of State Joint Regional Strategy, pp. 86-92; and USAID Cooperation Strategy, pp. 93-102. **[DMSPO Student Issue]**

(2) Review: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed July 29, 2017). Read applicable sections. **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Review: U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018). Read applicable sections. **[DMSPO Student Issue]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does design methodology work? Describe its iterative nature.

b. How can we best use design methodology to provide the best military advice to policy makers and value to the planning process?

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Block II Intent “Military Power Applied”

Block Chief: Col Stephen K. Van Riper

Purpose: Enable effective integration of service capabilities into an increasingly joint force that can work at the strategic level across the range of military operations. Ensure understanding of Landpower’s role in today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges.

Method: After having considered strategic direction, operational design, and the theater campaign as viewed by the geographical combatant commander in Block I, Block II presents overarching joint/service doctrine and concepts on joint warfare for comprehension and analysis. We will then look to synthesize this material into what it means for the concepts of “Globally Integrated Operations” and “Multi-Domain Battle.” Lastly, we will evaluate how doctrine and emerging concepts are impacting DOD’s ability to succeed in potential future endeavors. We will look at all the domains and services, but spend additional time with Cyber (the newest and most evolving arena), and Landpower (our charter to understand as the “School of Strategic Landpower”)

This module features student readings, seminar instruction, case studies, and optional student oral presentations on selected readings in support of program learning outcomes (PLOs), Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs).

End State: Students should proceed from this block with an understanding of current joint and Service doctrines, the emerging operating concepts that are being employed to shape the future, and the challenge and opportunities in how we fight “joint” today and in the future. Students should gain a better understanding of cyber as the Services and nation struggle to decide how it fits into our national security structure. Lastly, students should leave this block better able to articulate Landpower’s opportunities and challenges during joint discussions in combatant commands.

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JOINT WARFARE: TODAY AND TOMORROW

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-09-S

1. Introduction.

a. As the combatant commander transitions strategic direction into operations, actions and activities, he pulls together five very different services across five domains and seven joint functions to form a “joint force”. This lesson will discuss what a “Joint force” looks like (today and in the future), and the various lenses that impact how that force is evaluated for its ability to address national security challenges.

b. This lesson will discuss the various constructs (e.g. Domains, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Educations, Personnel, & Facilities (DOTMLPF), Transregional, Multi-domain, Multifunctional (TMM), Services) that DOD uses to synchronize thoughts, operations, actions and activities. This should prepare you to look at the services and domains in Lessons 10-13, and then to pull it all together in a study of “Landpower” during lesson 14.

c. This lesson, and much of this block, will use doctrine (“The theory you ascribe to”) to describe where each of the services ARE, and their Operating Concepts to show the challenges they see and where they want TO GO. An understanding of the current and emerging issues surrounding how best to operationalize “cross-domain synergy,” (aka Multi-Domain Battle) as described in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030 (CCJO)* and the *Army/Marine Corps Multi-Domain Battle Concept (MDB)*, is thus just as fundamental in the development of tomorrow’s military strategic leader as is understanding basic Joint doctrine.

d. Understanding how we got to where we are today, in joint DOTMLPF, is important to understanding how and why military professionals can see things differently and, more importantly, present forces differently to combatant commanders. That history is also important as we look to the future and how DOD adjusts to meet a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

e. This lesson’s readings take you through today’s touchstones, tomorrow’s aspirations, and thoughts on both.

(1) JP 1 and JP 3-0 are fundamental benchmarks toward synchronizing military professionals on what the Joint Force thinks and why. Understanding the latest JP 3-0 is therefore important in understanding where the DOD’s leadership thinks we are today.

(2) *The Capstone Concepts for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030 (CCJO)* is a draft concept that builds on the CCJO published in 2012. The CCJO “establishes an aim point for the development of the Joint Force out to 2030” as laid out by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This foundational document discusses the Future Security Environment and Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) as well as persistent trends taking place in the world. This lesson will evaluate this foundational document as a precursor to discussion on other emerging concepts like the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and the effects of these new doctrinal concepts and implications for the future of the joint force.

(3) As the Army and Marine Corps have tried to operationalize the CCJO, they have transitioned “Cross-Domain Synergy” into “Multi-Domain Battle” and are working through the various implications and ramifications of how these ideas will play out for doctrine, force presentation, and force development. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Concept: Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century (2025-2040) charts a conceptual path for two ‘Landpower’ services.

(4) Every new idea has challenges and there are four articles that lay out of the challenges inherent in concepts in general and MDB in particular. These articles will help you to begin analyzing the challenges, opportunities, strengths and weaknesses of where “joint” is today and where it will be as you step into strategic leadership roles.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** current and emerging doctrine and the current dialogue surrounding the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and other concepts (e.g. Multi-Domain Battle).

b. **Evaluate** the JP 1 and new JP 3-0 and the underpinnings for each of the concepts discussed for potential areas of synergy or friction between the services.

c. **Evaluate** each doctrine, concept and culture discussed and the implications for the current and future force.

d. **Evaluate** the maritime, land, and air domains and the role of Sea, Land, and Airpower as they relate to the operating concepts.

3. Enabling Outcome. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf (accessed July 26, 2017). Read pp. I-2, VI-1 to VI-4 and VI-9 to VI-11. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf (accessed July 26, 2017). Read "Organization of Joint Forces" pp IV-4 (paragraph 3) to IV-8. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) David A. Fastabend, "That Elusive Operational Concept," *Army* 51, no. 6 (June 2001), <http://www.readbag.com/ausa-publications-armymagazine-archive-2001-6-documents-fastabend-0601> (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. 37-44. **[Open Source URL]**

(4) U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030 (CCJO)*, Draft Working Document, Predecisional (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, as of June 28, 2016). **[Blackboard]**

(5) U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf (accessed July 28, 2017). Read EXSUM pp. i-iii. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(6) William Dries, "Some New, Some Old, All Necessary." *Fires* (May/June, 2017) [Proquest](#) (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. 16-18. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(7) Erik Heftye, "Multi-Domain Confusion: All Domains Are Not Created Equal," *Strategy Bridge*, May 26, 2017, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/5/26/multi-domain-confusion-all-domains-are-not-created-equal> (accessed July 26, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(8) *United States Army and Marine Corps Concept, Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040, Draft v1.0* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, October, 2017). Read i, 1-23. **[Blackboard]**

b. Focused Readings. (1/3 each class = Read 125 pgs)

(1) U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). Read pp. 1-33. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO)*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 7, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jceo.pdf (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. 1-35. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) United States Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), Future Joint Force Development, *Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planners Guide*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 14, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/cross_domain_planning_guide.pdf (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. 1-21. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* [Incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 July 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf (accessed July 26, 2017). Read pp. III-4 to III-8 (JS, Service and CCCMD Roles). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Robert M. Toguchi and James Houge, "The Battle of Convergence in Four Dimensions," *Military Review* (October 1992). Read pp. 11-20.

(3) Amos C. Fox, "Multi-Domain Battle: A Perspective on Salient Features of an Emerging Operational Doctrine" *Small Wars Journal* (May 21, 2017), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/multi-domain-battle-a-perspective-on-the-salient-features-of-an-emerging-operational-doctri> (accessed July 26, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Robert B. Brown, "The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept," *Military Review Online* (March 20, 2017), https://www.army.mil/article/184551/the_indo_asia_pacific_and_the_multi_domain_battle_concept (accessed July 28, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) S.H. Swift, "U.S. Pacific Fleet Perspective on Multi-Domain Battle," memorandum for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Pearl Harbor, HI, February 13, 2017.

(6) Greg Grant and Paul Benfield, "Get out of Your Lane: The End of Discrete Domains" *War on The Rocks*, entry posted January 26, 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/get-out-of-your-lane-the-end-of-discrete-domains/> (accessed July 26, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. Are the current constructs for looking at where (Domains) and how (Joint Doctrine and Concepts) still relevant? What are the positives and negatives of each? What are the relevant "Domains" and why?

b. How have we historically dealt with each domain and what benefits and baggage comes from that history?

c. Do JP 1 and JP 3-0 describe how we actually do things or how we hope to do things? Are they true guides for strategic leaders? Why or why not?

d. What are CCJO and JOAC? What are they not? What assumptions are these concepts predicated upon? Are the assumptions valid? How does each concept relate to the others and other operational concepts and strategic guidance documents?

e. What is meant by Globally Integrated Operations, Cross-domain synergy, and Multi-Domain Battle? How can the joint force maximize these concepts to "drive jointness deeper?" And what does that mean and what might it look like?

f. What improvements might be made to better align today and tomorrow's joint force to meet the demands of operating in TMM? Are these changes compatible with other force structure initiatives, such as JOAC? Where might there be areas of friction?

U. S. ARMY AND U. S. NAVY

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-10-S

1. Introduction.

a. The lesson addresses the Army and Navy's doctrine and operating concepts and the respective services' capability to exploit the air, land, and maritime domains to provide CCDR's with forces to meet the full range of military operations. The lesson will examine the Army and Navy service capabilities, how their forces are presented to a joint commander and, finally, discuss the cultural differences of the two services and how these differences affect the Services' force presentations, doctrine, and view of joint operations.

b. The nation's founders viewed the United States as a maritime nation, dependent on unfettered access to the seas for trade, transportation, communication, and defense. The importance of maritime forces was a legacy the founders understood as former colonists under the British Empire, the great sea power of that age. They formalized their view within the U.S. Constitution by the requirement that Congress "maintain a Navy." In today's dynamic security environment, with multiple challenges from state and non-state actors that are often fed by social disorder, political upheaval, and technological advancements, that requirement is even more prescient.

c. Long before man thought of venturing on the sea or into the air, he lived on the land. When his aspirations conflicted with that of another, he fought and died on the land. Landpower in its various forms has been at the core of warfare since time immemorial. Furthermore, as other forms of military power like air and sea power were being developed, man defined these in relation to the land domain and the use of land forces. At its core land warfare has changed little in the past 1,000 years. Ultimately, it is simple and messy, but effective. But Landpower's timelessness is perhaps its undoing.

d. The domains of conflict and the conduct of warfare have continued to evolve, challenging theorists and strategists for much of recorded history. The *Theory of War and Strategy* (TWS) course addressed land and maritime theorists and provided a basic understanding of the nature and characteristics of war and warfare. At first, conflict was of necessity limited to the original domain: land. Maritime domain considerations quickly came about as man ventured forth upon the sea. The *National Security Policy and Strategy* (NSPS) course provided insights into how the Joint Force – arrayed across the domains - is a "means" of national policy that is wielded in "ways" to achieve national "ends." The Army and Navy provide the principal contribution to the military

instrument of national power in the land and maritime domains.

e. This lesson will merge theories with structures to discuss how CCMDs and joint forces conduct themselves in today's and tomorrow's strategic environment. How do theories and cultures affect presentation of forces and joint operations?

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the differences in doctrine, concepts, structure, and culture of the land and sea services; and how these differences affect the Services' view of joint operations.

b. **Evaluate** the doctrine, operating concepts and culture of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy; as they affect the way the services organize and present forces to Joint Force Commanders.

c. **Evaluate** the use and role of sea power as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

3. Enabling Outcome. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and reflect on the "points to consider."

b. Required Readings.

(1) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, Army Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2012), <https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/303969.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. 1-1 thru 1-8. **[Online] [Blackboard]**

(2) Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 31, 2014), <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. iv and 7-25. **[Online] [Blackboard]**

(3) H. R. McMaster, "Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War," *Military Review* 95, no. 2 (March/April 2015), http://minerva.dtic.mil/doc/McMaster_Continuity_and_Change_article.pdf (accessed July 25, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "The Army Gropes Toward a Cultural Revolution," *Breaking Defense*, October 22, 2014, <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/10/the-army-gropes-toward-a-cultural-revolution/> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) David W. Barno and Nora Bensahel, "Six Ways to Fix the Army's Culture." *War on the Rocks*, September 6, 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/six-ways-to-fix-the-armys-culture/> (accessed Oct 12, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Navy, March 2015), <http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf> (accessed July 29, 2017). Read pp. 1-26. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(7) Geoffrey Till, "The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Another View From Outside," *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 4 (Autumn 2015), <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/dbd0a88b-81c4-4de3-9314-927dd42214bc/The-New-U-S--Maritime-Strategy--Another-View-from-.aspx> (accessed August 19, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(8) Headquarters, U.S. Navy, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 1.0* (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, January 2016), http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf (accessed August 29, 2016). Read pp. 1-8. **[Online] [Blackboard]**

b. Focused Reading. U.S. Naval War College, NWC 3153N, Joint Military Operations Reference Guide, "Forces Capabilities Handbook" (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2014). Scan pp. 2-28, 67-77, and 125-131. **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) John A. Bonin, *Army Organization and Employment Data* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, January, 2017). **[Blackboard]**

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, ADP 1, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 2012 with Change 1, dated November 7, 2012), <https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/303969.pdf> (accessed July 29, 2017). Read Chapter 3. **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011), https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/ADP_3-0_ULO_Oct_2011_APD.pdf (accessed July 29, 2017). Read pp. 1-14. **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Frank Hoffman, "No Strategic Success Without 21st Century Seapower: Forward Partnering," *War On The Rocks*, entry posted July 1, 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/no-strategic-success-without-21st-century-seapower-forward-partnering/> (accessed July 29, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Bryan McGrath, "America's New Maritime Strategy: How Will China Respond?" *The National Interest*, entry posted April 10, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/americas-new-maritime-strategy-how-will-china-respond-12592> (accessed July 29, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is Seapower? What is the value of maritime forces? How are the maritime forces of the United States seen in the context of national strategy and protecting national interests? How does the U.S. Navy present forces to a joint commander?

b. How are the maritime services' operating concepts shaped by the domains in which they operate? How do the maritime forces influence the land domain? What capabilities, limitations, and comparative advantages do naval forces provide to geographic combatant commanders in executing their mission at the theater level across the range of military operations (ROMO)?

e. What training, organizational, and equipment changes will likely be needed to create the forces needed for the maritime operating concept? What opportunities and challenges might be this present?

f. How are the land forces of the United States seen in the context of national strategy and securing objectives? How are they viewed as a means to an end? What is the value of land forces? What are some of the stigmas associated with land forces?

g. How does the U.S. Army's new operating concept differ from that of Air Land Battle? Why the change? What training, organizational, and equipment changes will likely be needed to create the force needed for the new operating concept? What opportunities and challenges might be presented during this transformation?

h. How are U.S. Army forces presented to a joint commander?

U.S. AIR FORCE and SPACE

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-11-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson focuses on the air and space domains. Although relatively new in the long and extensive history of warfare, the advent of technologies that operate in both air and space domains through the last century has had a profound impact on how the military instrument of power supports national security objectives. Exploiting the vertical flank dramatically changed the character of warfare as military organizations developed innovative ways of gaining asymmetric advantages over adversaries. Air and space domains are increasingly indivisible, and though the U.S. Air Force organizes itself to operate in these spaces, all service branches are considerable stakeholders. The vertical dimension has become an indispensable component of military strategy, doctrine, planning, and the execution of joint and combined operations. Furthermore, the ability to operate in these spaces provides civilian leaders a variety of options for implementing national security strategy.

b. During the *Theory of War and Strategy* course, you read about and discussed air and space power theorists and their views on how best to utilize these domains in a military context. This lesson will expand on what you learned in TWS-12 as we move from theory to current and future application. Your readings and discussions will focus on current and future operating concepts in the air and space domains as well as some Service-specific aspects of the U.S. Air Force with regards to presentation of forces and command and control of joint air operations.

c. Although this lesson focuses on air and space domains and concepts, think in a broader context of aerospace power implications to multi-domain operations, Service interdependencies, the future of the joint force, and impacts to national security strategy.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the differences in doctrine, concepts, structure, and culture of the air force versus the land and sea services; and how these differences affect the Services' view of joint operations.

b. **Evaluate** the doctrine, operating concepts and culture of the U.S. Air Force; as they affect the way the service organizes and presents forces to joint force commanders.

c. **Evaluate** the use and role of airpower and space power as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 2011) <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=10828> (accessed September 21, 2017). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Space Operations*, Joint Publication 3-14 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2013), http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf (accessed July 20, 2017). Read II-1 to II-10, III-1 to III-5. Scan IV-1 to IV-18. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) Elbridge Colby, *From Sanctuary to Battlefield: A Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, January 2016) https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Space-Report_16107.pdf?mtime=20160906081938 (accessed September 21, 2017). Read pp. 4-16. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Future Operating Concept*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, September 2015), <http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/AFFOC.pdf> (accessed August 23, 2016). Read pp. 7-13. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(5) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Annex 3-30 Command and Control* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center, November 2014), <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-30-Annex-COMMAND-CONTROL.pdf> (accessed August 23, 2016). Read pp. 54-59, Scan pp. 79-89. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(6) Stephen O. Fought, "The Tale of the C/JFACC: A Long and Winding Road," *Air and Space Power Journal* XVIII, No. 4 (Winter 2004), http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-18_Issue-1-4/win04.pdf (accessed July 24, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) Theresa Hitchens and Joan Johnson-Freese, *Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing*, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, June, 2016), <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/toward-a-new-national-security-space-strategy-time-for-a-strategic-rebalancing> (accessed September 21, 2017). Read Executive Summary. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Rebecca M. Cowen-Hirsch, "Op-ed: Recent Policies, Position Statements Bring Promise of New Era of "Space Superiority," *Space News*, July 17, 2017, <http://spacenews.com/op-ed-recent-policies-position-statements-bring-promise-of-new-era-of-space-superiority/> (accessed July 20, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Mike Rogers and Jim Cooper, "Op-ed: America Needs a Space Corps," *Space News*, July 14, 2017, <http://spacenews.com/america-needs-a-space-corps/> (accessed July 20, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Brian G. Chow, "Op-ed: China's Well-Crafted Counterspace Strategy," *Space News*, July 10, 2017, <http://spacenews.com/op-ed-chinas-well-crafted-counterspace-strategy/> (accessed July 20, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Mike Pietrucha and Mike Benitez, "Political Airpower, Part II: The Seductive Allure of Precision Weapons," *War on the Rocks*, November 29, 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/political-airpower-part-ii-the-seductive-allure-of-precision-weapons/> (accessed September 21, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Mackenzie Eaglen, "Air Force Delivers New and Innovative Vision of Future Warfare," *Real Clear Defense*, September 15, 2015, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/09/15/air_force_delivers_new_and_innovative_vision_of_future_warfare_108468.html (accessed September 21, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(7) Mike Hostage, "A Seat at the Table: Beyond the Air Component Coordination Element," *Air and Space Power Journal*, XXIV, no. 4 (Winter 2010), http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-24_Issue-1-4/2010_Vol24_No4.pdf (accessed July 20, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *The Future of Air and Space Power: Air Force Posture Statement Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget Request*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, June 6, 2017), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wilson-Goldfein_06-06-17.pdf (accessed July 20, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Annex 3-14, Space Operations* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center, June 2012), <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-14-Annex-SPACE-OPS.pdf> (accessed July 20, 2017). Read 1-9, 12-16, SCAN 31-68. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) Air University, *Fast Space: Leveraging Ultra Low-Cost Space access for the 21st Century Challenges* (Montgomery, AL: Air University, January 13, 2017), http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/Research/documents/Space/Fast%20Space_Public_2017.pdf (accessed September 21, 2017). Read Executive Summary. **[Open Source URL]**

(4) U.S. Department of Defense, *Space Domain Mission Assurance: A Resilience Taxonomy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global Security, September 2015), <http://www.hostedpayloadalliance.org/getattachment/Resources/White-Papers/Resilience-Taxonomy-White-Paper.pdf.aspx> (accessed September 21, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Robert Butterworth, "Space and the Joint Fight," *Strategic Forum*, SF no. 275 (February 2012) <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-275.pdf> (accessed September 21, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Headquarters, United States Air Force, *Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Air Force, February 7, 2005), <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA495248> (accessed July 24, 2017). Read 109-121. **[Open Source URL]**

(7) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Volume 1 – Basic Doctrine* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center, February 27, 2015), <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=Volume-1-Basic-Doctrine.pdf> (accessed August 23, 2016). Read pp. 23-35. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(8) U.S. Department of Defense, *Space Policy*, Department of Defense Directive 3100.10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 18, 2012, incorporating Change 1, effective November 4, 2016).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is Airpower? What is the relationship between the air domain and Airpower? What is the difference between Airpower and air forces? Why do we care? Is the distinction important?

b. How is Airpower perceived in the context of U.S. national strategy and achievement of political objectives? How is it viewed as a means to an end? What is the value of Airpower? What are some of the concerns associated with civilian

leadership and the general population's perception of Airpower?

c. What capabilities, limitations, and competitive advantages does the Air Force provide to Geographic Combatant Commanders in executing their mission at the theater level across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)?

d. What is the role of Space in joint military operations? What are some concerns regarding space capabilities from a joint force perspective?

e. What are some of the unique challenges, if any, to coalition operations with regards to the air and space domains?

f. How is the Air Force Future Operating Concept shaped by the unique nature of the air and space domains? What areas do you agree or disagree with regarding the concept? Why, or why not?

MARINES, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, COAST GUARD

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-12-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson focuses on services that see themselves as operating across multiple domains or mission specific roles rather than dominating a particular domain. Understanding how these forces see themselves, frame their roles, and shape their culture facilitates their incorporation into joint planning and option development. The U.S. Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coast Guard see themselves as unique forces that emphasize agility, adaptability, versatility, and flexibility as integral components of their culture and character.

b. U.S. Marine Corps doctrine and culture emphasizes the expeditionary, combined arms, and “force in readiness” nature of the Corps. Always prepared to act, the Marine Corps values critical thinking and innovation in its Marines to solve complex problems rapidly with tailorable force packages.

c. U.S. Special Operations Command merges combatant command responsibilities with Service-like functions to offer national leaders and joint force commanders a force with a global perspective, persistent presence, and a nuanced understanding of environments derived from partnerships with indigenous forces. Operating in the space between war and peace, SOCOM attempts to shape the environment through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national approaches in support of geographic combatant commanders and the DoD.

d. At all times the U.S. Coast Guard is a law enforcement agency, a commercial regulatory agency, an armed service, and a member of the intelligence community. The unique blend of authorities, capabilities, competences and partnerships provide a joint force commander with options not found in other services.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the differences in doctrine, concepts, structure, and culture of the U.S. Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces and U.S. Coast Guard versus the other services; and how these differences affect the Services’ view of joint operations.

c. **Evaluate** the doctrine, operating concepts and culture of the U.S. Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces and the U.S Coast Guard; as they affect the way the service organizes and presents forces to joint force commanders.

b. **Evaluate** the use and role of the U.S. Marine Corps, SOF and Coast Guard as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

3. Enabling Outcome. None.

4. Student Requirements

a. Required Readings.

(1) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operations*, MCDP 1-0 (Quantico, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities Development and Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, August 9, 2011), <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201-0%20Marine%20Corps%20Operations.pdf> (accessed July 26, 2017). Read pp. 1-1 through 1-5 and scan 2-6 through 2-24. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century* (Quantico, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities Development and Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, September 2016), <http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/MOC/Marine%20Corps%20Operating%20Concept%20Sept%202016.pdf?ver=2016-09-28-084156-190> (accessed July 27, 2017). Read pp. 1-10 and scan pp. 11-27. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf (accessed July 26, 2017). Read Chapter 1 and scan Chapter 2. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operating Concept* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, February 1, 2016), http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/SOF-Operating-Concept-v1-0_020116-Final.pdf (accessed July 25, 2017). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(5) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Special Operations*, ADP 3-05 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 31, 2012), http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp3_05.pdf (accessed July 25, 2017). Scan "ARSOF Imperatives," pp. 13-16. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(6) Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, *Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard*, Coast Guard Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, February 2014), http://www.overview.uscg.mil/Portals/6/Documents/PDF/CGPub_1-0_Doctrine.pdf?ver=2016-10-20-094949-363 (accessed July 24, 2017). Read pp. 5-25, scan pp. 73-91. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, MCDP 1 (Quantico, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities Development and Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, June 20, 1997), <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf> (accessed July 24, 2017). Read pp. 69-96. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *ARSOF Operating Concept 2022*, (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, September 26, 2014), <http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%20Operating%20Concept%202014.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2016). Read Chapters 1, 2, and 4. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *USASOC 2035: Communicating the ARSOF Narrative and Setting the Course to 2035* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2016), <http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/USASOC2035%20Overview.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2017). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, *Strategic Challenges Facing our Nation-U.S. Coast Guard Perspective* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, December 2, 2016), http://www.overview.uscg.mil/Portals/6/Documents/PDF/Strategic%20Challenges%20Facing%20our%20Nation_US%20Coast%20Guard%20Perspective_WITH%20COVER.pdf?ver=2016-12-12-142116-477 (accessed August 10, 2017). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operating Concept* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, May 2013), <https://fortunascorner.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/final-low-res-sof-operating-concept-may-2013.pdf> (accessed July 26, 2017). Read pp. 3-18. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, May 2013), <http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2017). Read pp. 1-8. **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Charles T. Cleveland, James B. Linder, and Ronald Dempsey, "Special Operations Doctrine: Is it Needed?" *PRISM* 6, No. 3 (Washington, DC: The Center for Complex Operations, December 2016), <http://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM-6-3/Article/1020147/special-operations-doctrine-is-it-needed/> (accessed July 26, 2017). Read pp. 5-18. **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Austin Long, "The Limits of Special Operations Forces," *PRISM* 6, No. 3 (Washington, DC: The Center for Complex Operations, December 2016), <http://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM-6-3/Article/1020184/the-limits-of-special-operations-forces/> (accessed July 26, 2017). Read pp. 35-46. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What capabilities, limitations, and comparative advantages do the U.S. Marine Corps, SOF and the Coast Guard provide to geographic combatant commanders in executing their mission at the theater level across the range of military operations (ROMO)?

b. What are the roles of the U.S. Marine Corps, SOF and the Coast Guard and how do they contribute to the JIIM environment?

c. How are the U.S. Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces presented to a joint commander?

d. What possible problem sets are appropriate for the application of special operations forces and, by contrast, which ones are not? What relationship should exist between general purpose land forces and special operations forces?

CYBERSPACE

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Lesson: TSC-13-L/S

1. Introduction. Cyberspace (often called Cyber) is the newest of the defined military domains. The appreciation of what is the strategic value of the cyberspace domain, its complexity, and its interaction with the other domains, is evolving. In cyberspace, specific roles and “lanes in the road” within the US government are often “crossed” and not clearly “marked”. Lines become blurred as we view cyberspace through different lenses. There are numerous cyberspace stakeholders; military, law enforcement, intelligence community, diplomatic, political and commercial. Attribution is very difficult. Congress is continually looking at numerous pending cyberspace security bills which continue to adjust responsibilities and authorities. Even at the Congressional level, there are equities amongst the various committees – Intel, Armed Services, Commerce, Homeland Defense, and others. Recent increased malicious cyberspace activity has caused the US government to increase its “whole of government” reaction, working toward extensive cooperation “behind the scenes” with regards to identification and mitigation of cyberspace threats.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** current and evolving cyberspace definitions, structures, policy, and strategy.

b. **Analyze** the doctrine, concepts, structure, and culture of cyber organizations and Forces; how these affect the interaction of commercial, federal government, DoD, and international interests in the cyberspace domains.

c. **Evaluate** the doctrine, operating concepts, structure, and culture of cyber organizations and forces; as they affect the way the services and CYBERCOM, organize and present forces to Joint Force Commanders.

c. **Analyze** how the GCC integrates cyberspace to achieve theater objectives.

b. **Evaluate** the use and role of cyber forces as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

3. Enabling Outcome. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points to consider in the seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Admiral Michael S. Rogers, *Prepared Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander of United States Cyber Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., May 9, 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rogers_05-09-17.pdf (accessed July 24, 2017). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) GEN Keith B. Alexander, USA (Ret.), *Prepared Statement on Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cyberspacesecurity Conversation before the Subcommittees on Information Technology and National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform*, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 13, 2016, <https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Gen-Alexander-Statement-Digital-Acts-of-War-7-13.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2016). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Department of Defense, "Fact Sheet: The Department of Defense (DOD) Cyberspace Strategy," April 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0415_Cyber-Strategy/ (accessed July 15, 2016). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Cyberspace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-12 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 5, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf (accessed July 15, 2016). Read Chapter 3: Authorities, Roles and Responsibilities, and Chapter 4: Planning and Coordination. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(5) Glenn S. Gerstell, "Confronting the Cybersecurity Challenge," Keynote Address at 2017 Law, Ethics and National Security Conference, Duke Law School, February 25, 2017, <https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/speeches-testimonies/speeches/20170225-gerstell-duke-keynote.shtml> (accessed August 28 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Center for Strategic Leadership, *Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1 June 2016), http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/Strategic_Cyberspace_Operations_Guide_1_June_2016.pdf (accessed July 15, 2016). Read pp. 6-20. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, *The DoD Cyberspace Strategy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyberspace-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBERSPACE_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf (accessed July 15, 2016). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. Is the U.S. government's organizational construct effective to conduct cyberspace operations and defend cyberspace in the future? Why or why not? What is USCYBERCOM's role?

b. How are commercial, civil, DOD, and international interests intertwined in the cyberspace domain? How does this impact the way we plan and execute operations? What are the challenges and opportunities?

c. What is a cyber act of war?

d. Are commanders prepared to execute their missions when faced with degraded or denied cyberspace environment? How might a loss of confidence in systems affect operations and sustainment?

e. How does the use of cyberspace assist the combatant commanders' execution of strategic guidance? What capabilities do they provide? What vulnerabilities do they present? How do CCDRs request and coordinate cyberspace and support?

f. Are the critical infrastructures of the United States appropriately defended? What policy or technology changes need to happen to remedy the situation?

g. When a cyberspace-attack is detected, who has the lead? What if the attack originates from within the United States? How can sensitive (classified) attack information be passed to commercial interests or allies? Where do we draw the line between crime / hackers / industrial espionage / foreign intelligence / insider threats and how does that affect operations and U.S. policies?

LANDPOWER AND JOINT OPERATIONS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-14-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson culminates the dialogue on the application of military instruments of national power in multidomain synergy. In it we will review the domains, the services, and other typologies we have uncovered, to take a hard look at how joint forces organize military power. As a soon-to-be graduate of the “School of Strategic Landpower” it is only right that the joint community expects you to be an expert on how all of these ideas, typologies, and forces impact land. This lesson will focus on how the changing character of war is impacting land and the humans that live on it. More importantly, it will discuss what this means to combatant commanders and other joint forces.

b. Landpower in its various forms has been at the core of warfare since time immemorial. Furthermore, technical advancements, particularly those in the past 100 years, have not altered the facts that humankind are land creatures, and, while warfare is conducted across domains of air, land, sea, space, and cyber, its successful conclusion is almost always terminated by operations on land. Indeed, as other forms of military power like air and space power were being developed in the last century, man defined these emergent domains in relation to the land domain and the use of land forces.

c. Technological innovations, mainly originating in the air, sea, cyber, and space domains, capture the attention of the American public and U.S. Congress. Combined with the ethical uncomfortableness associated with close-proximity warfare, some may gravitate towards military advancements promoting sterile, offset, push-button conflict. Standing in contrast, Landpower is not defined by platforms or technology, but by “young men in the mud.”³ At its core, the principles of land warfare have changed little in the past 1,000 years. However, as we wrestle with the changing nature of war and how it affects the combatant commander, it is worth reviewing the roles, functions, and missions of U.S. land forces and how all forces impact the land where people live.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Understand** the foundational precepts of Landpower as a geopolitical concept inseparable from human activity and complicated by national and cultural differences.

³ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (Potomac Books: New York, 2001), p. 290.

b. **Evaluate** the various concepts (including Multi-Domain Battle) and how their implementation might affect the way services organize and present forces to Joint Force Commanders.

c. **Synthesize** a model of landpower that is suitable for framing complex, ill-structured problems in the 21st century, and dealing with today's dynamic security environment and potential future operating environments (such as mass immigration, nonstate actors, regional hegemony, and emergent autocracies).

d. **Evaluate** the use and role of Landpower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf (accessed July 26, 2017). Review pp. I-4 to I-5, and I-14 to I-17. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, Army Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2012), <https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/303969.pdf> (accessed August 7, 2017). Review pp. 1-4. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, Joint Publication 3-31 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 February 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_31.pdf (accessed August 28, 2017). Read pp. I-3 to I-9, II-1 to II-3 and review graphic on II-10. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). Read "The Grammar of Strategy, I: Terrestrial Action," Chapter 8, pp. 206-215. **[USAWC Library Student Issue]**

(5) Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer, 1993) [Proquest](#) (accessed November 9, 2017). **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(6) G. K. Cunningham, "Landpower: Foundations and Contemporary Applications," Extract from *Guide to National Security and Strategy*, 2nd Edition, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/policy_strategy.pdf (accessed July 26, 2017). Read pages 155-171. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(7) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, Draft Working Document, Predecisional v 0.8 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as of 16 June 2017). Read pp 6 (line 200) – 12 (line 420) and 15 (line 560) – 27 (line 1017). **[Blackboard]**

(8) U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, *Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Draft v1.0, October, 2017). Review pp. ii and 1-23. Read pp. 24-28. **[Blackboard]**

(9) Gary J. Volesky and Roger Nobel, "Theater Land Operations: Relevant Observations and Lessons from the Combined Joint Land Force Experience in Iraq," *Military Review Online Exclusive* (June 2017) <http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2017-Online-Exclusive-Articles/Theater-Land-Operations/> (accessed September 9, 2017). Read pp. 1-8. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

b. Focused Readings. Lukas Milevski, "Fortissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy," *Parameters*, Volume 42, Issue 2 (Summer 2012) [Proquest](#) (accessed August 25, 2017) **[Open Source URL]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) William T. Johnsen, *Re-Examining the Roles of Landpower in the 21st Century and Their Implications* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2014), <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1237.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "The Army Gropes Toward a Cultural Revolution," *Breaking Defense*, October 22, 2014, <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/10/the-army-gropes-toward-a-cultural-revolution/> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Bill Van Auken and David North, "The Army Operating Concept (AOC): U.S. Army Drafts Blueprint for World War III," *Global Research*, October 14, 2014, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-army-drafts-blueprint-for-world-war-iii/5407869> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, ADP 1, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 2012, with Change 1, dated November 7, 2012), <https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/303969.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2017). Read Chapter 3. **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Major Fernando M. Lujan, *Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, March 2013), <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/light-footprints-the-future-of-american-military-intervention> (accessed July 28, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) U.S. Naval War College, NWC 3153N, *Joint Military Operations Reference Guide: Forces Capabilities Handbook* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2014). Read “U.S. Army,” pp. 30-66.

(7) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011), https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/ADP_3-0_ULO_Oct_2011_APD.pdf (accessed July 28, 2017). Read pp. 1-14. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is Landpower? What is the relationship between the land domain and Landpower? What is the difference between Landpower and land forces? Why do we care? Is the distinction important? Why or why not?

b. How are the land forces of the U.S. seen in the context of national strategy and securing objectives? How are they viewed as a means to an end? What is the value of land forces? What are some of the stigmas associated with land forces?

c. How does the Multi-Domain Battle Concept, the Army Operating Concept and the Marine Operating Concepts differ from that of AirLand Battle? Why the change? What training, organizational, and equipment changes will likely be needed to create the force needed for the new operating concept(s)? What opportunities and challenges might be presented during this transformation?

d. Compare and contrast the Cunningham extract with Huntington’s works. How does Samuel Huntington’s concept of the “clash of civilizations” at the end of the 20th century comport with Halford Mackinder’s original concept of landpower at the beginning of the 20th century? What implications are there for the 21st century?

e. How are land forces presented to a joint commander? What are the capabilities and limitations of land forces, and what relationships should exist between U.S. Army forces, special operations forces, and U.S. Marine MAGTFs?

f. Can we achieve ‘cross domain synergy’ with our current constructs in a way that achieves the level of jointness envisioned by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? How are the various concepts and service constructs helping or hindering that vision?

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Block III Intent “Unified Action”

Block Chief: Prof Mike Marra

Purpose: This block examines implementing the U.S. National Military Strategy and subsequent theater strategies using all elements of national power through a unified approach in concert with interagency partners, allies and coalition partners in the context of a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. This block also examines the top priority of all our military efforts, homeland defense, through the actions and activities of all combatant commanders in the Transregional, Multi-domain, Multi-functional (TMM) environment.

Method: This module features student readings, guest lectures, seminar instruction, case studies, an interagency panel, and optional student oral presentations on selected readings in support of programed learning outcomes (PLOs), Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs).

End state: Students should proceed from this block with an understanding of theater strategy implemented through “unified action” synchronized with our US agency partners and in close coordination with our allied and coalition partners to ultimately protect the homeland, our interests and our alliances.

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HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Lesson: TSC-15-L/S

The U.S. Constitution—and the federal system of government it created—ensures that the response to a domestic catastrophic event will be complex. Our constitutional system of checks and balances was well designed to protect the liberty of the people from government oppression. It was not designed to efficiently move many tons of supplies, hundreds of helicopters, thousands of vehicles, and perhaps 100,000 military personnel into the chaotic environment of a devastating natural disaster, terrorist attack, or nation-state act of aggression upon the U.S. homeland.

-Paul McHale, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

In 2035, the United States will confront an increasing number of state and non-state actors with the will and capabilities to threaten targets within the homeland and U.S. citizens with the ultimate intention to coerce.

– *Joint Operating Environment 2035*, 14 July 2016, p. 24

1. Introduction.

a. For more than a century the U.S. strategic environment has allowed the DoD to defend the homeland without conducting operations in the homeland. However, it would be imprudent to assume that condition will persist in perpetuity. To meet its obligations to the nation the DoD must be prepared to conduct homeland defense in the homeland and provide defense support to civil authorities.

b. Senior national security professionals responsible for accomplishing these essential DoD missions must understand the unique authorities, roles, and responsibilities as instituted in law and policy.

c. The unique authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the DoD in Homeland Defense (HD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) reflect the ethos, or philosophical underpinnings, that define civil-military relations in the United States. The limitations on the U.S. military in HD and DSCA missions are primarily founded on two notions: first, that U.S. civil authorities (often at the state and local level) are in all but the most unusual of circumstances in charge of any disaster response requiring military action, and second, that American citizens (and law) demand a pronounced separation between the roles of law enforcement and defense.

d. In this lesson students will examine these authorities along with the roles and responsibilities of the various Service components and interagency partners. This examination must be made with a clear understanding of the doctrinal distinctions between homeland security, homeland defense, and defense support of civil authorities.

e. The first half of this lesson will be spent in a Bliss Hall lecture by Professor Bert Tussing. The second half of the lesson will be in seminar.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Understand** the DoD's roles, missions, responsibilities, authorities (to include active component and reserve component funding), and limitations (to include the Posse Comitatus Act) for planning and executing HD and DSCA missions.

b. **Analyze** the factors that make the homeland unique as an area of operations; implications of our federal form of government; active layered defense; legal and policy restrictions on the employment of force; and unique capabilities required to respond to current and future threats.

c. **Analyze** DoD and USNORTHCOM command and control challenges and options for achieving unity of effort within the military response to civil requirements in times of crises, to include interaction between the active component and the National Guard in Title 10, Title 32, and State Active Duty statuses.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the interrelated yet distinct HD and DSCA missions and how they support homeland security.

b. **Comprehend** the roles and missions of defense coordinating officers and defense coordination elements in each FEMA region.

c. **Comprehend** the authority of DoD to provide Civil Support as contained in the Stafford Act and Economy Act.

d. **Comprehend** the limitations on the employment of U.S. military forces in the homeland imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act.

e. **Comprehend** the role of a Dual Status Commander during an emergency response.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings.

(2) Review the principles of military involvement in national security decision-making (NSPS Lesson 8); see Amos A. Jordan et al., "The Role of the Military in the Policy Process," in *American National Security*, 6th ed., ed. Amos A. Jordan et al. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 170-89.

(3) Attend Bert Tussing's lecture in Bliss Hall from 0830 until 1000.

(4) Be prepared to discuss major points from the readings and the speaker's presentation in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Walter Neal Anderson, *Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, eds Bert B. Tussing and Robert McCreight (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015). Read "Civil-Military Partnership: Homeland Defense Enterprise," Chapter 3, pp. 37-62. **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Homeland Defense*, Joint Publication 3-27 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 29, 2013). http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_27.pdf (accessed July 19, 2017). Read Chapter I and Scan Chapter II. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, Joint Publication 3-28 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 31, 2013). http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_28.pdf (accessed July 19, 2017). Read Chapter I and Scan Chapter II. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil, "Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander" (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, April 2015), <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1263.pdf> (accessed August 30, 2016). Read Chapter 2 (pp 7- 17), Scan Chapter 3 (pp 23- 47), and Read Chapter 4 (pp 53-76). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 3rd Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf (accessed August 1, 2016). Read pp. 1-7, scan pp. 8-54. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Ivan Luke, "DOD Operations in the Homeland: Context and Issues for the Commander," NWC 2067D (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, July 2016). Read pp. 1-19.

(2) Charles Doyle and Jennifer K. Elsea, *The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 16, 2012), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=721296> (accessed July 19, 2017). Read pp. 22-51.

(3) *Defense Support of Civil Authorities: A Vital Resource in the Nation's Homeland Security Missions*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session, June 10, 2015, Serial No. 114-20, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=790087> (accessed July 19, 2017).

(4) U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2015-2016* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 28, 2015), <https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dclm/pubs/HTAR.pdf> (accessed July 29, 2016). Read Chapter 20, "Defense Support of Civil Authority."

(5) Lori J. Robinson, *Statement of General Lori J. Robinson, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., April 6, 2017, <http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/NC%202017%20Posture%20Statement%20Final.pdf?ver=2017-04-06-110952-160> (accessed October 2, 2017).

(6) Sandra Erwin, "Hurricane Harvey: Pentagon Steps Up Military Support," *Real Clear Defense Online*, article posted August 28, 2017, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/28/hurricane_harvey_pentagon_steps_up_military_support_112166.html (accessed August 31, 2017).

5. Points to Consider.

- a. What are the boundaries and intersections of DoD's HD and DSCA missions?
- b. What is the ideal role for DoD in the U.S. homeland? How do U.S. laws, values, culture, and traditions influence that role?

c. What unique legal, policy, organizational, geographic, and operational factors and challenges must planners take into consideration during the campaign design process for HD and DSCA? Specifically consider active and reserve component command structures and funding sources.

d. How should the DoD allocate its resources and activities among forward regions, approaches, and the homeland in order to fulfill the HD and DSCA missions?

e. How does the National Response Framework (NRF) frame DoD's role in interagency cooperation for incident response? What similar guidance would facilitate interagency cooperation in support of DoD pertaining to the homeland defense mission?

f. What are the anticipated benefits and challenges with establishing a Dual Status Commander?

UNIFIED ACTION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-16-S

1. Introduction.

a. According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, “joint warfare is team warfare” and “the nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team.” In other words, success in conflict requires **unified action** – as described in Joint Publication 1 as “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” This unified action, however, is not automatic and takes place only when clear command relationships and unity of understanding and effort exist at all levels. The advantages of unified action are numerous. Nonetheless, given disparate Service, departmental, and interagency cultures and biases, working together in an integrated, cohesive manner requires much more than a simple willingness to do so and is not achieved without effort and diligence. The U.S. Congress, in recognition of these facts, set forth the principles of unified action in the National Security Act of 1947, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and more recently in the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.

b. In the pursuit of American policy objectives, all agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) are charged with promoting political and economic freedom, as well as fostering peaceful relations among nations. In peace, crisis, and war, the centerpiece of USG success is achieving **unified action** that brings all elements of U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power to bear in a coordinated, synchronized, and effective manner. The key to that success will be in integrating the cooperative efforts of all departments and agencies through a **comprehensive approach** to achieve a common set of goals that result in policy success. In recent years, the complexities of the operational environment and evolving challenges by irregular and non-state actors have made Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational operations imperatives for strategic success. To envision, plan, and synchronize such efforts effectively, the combatant commander must understand the organization and processes employed by our interagency partners in pursuing comprehensive goals. While combatant commanders may have varying degrees of influence in the policymaking process, this lesson is first and foremost an examination of how interagency actions are synchronized with combatant command theater strategy and actions to achieve comprehensive political-strategic effect.

c. This lesson on **unified action** and the **comprehensive approach** should serve as a fundamental and foundational lesson in your Army War College education. As a strategic leader, you will increasingly face challenges in which your ability to enhance unified action and craft comprehensive solutions will yield more effective achievement of

national political-strategic objectives. This lesson delves into the details of interagency planning and clarifies the similarities and differences with military planning. Additionally, it will show the linkages between the planning methods to attain unity of effort.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the comprehensive approach in integrating all instruments of national power — Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) — to achieve political-strategic effect.

b. **Analyze** the primary actors, their authorities, challenges and processes that facilitate the synchronization and implementation of national strategy at the theater level.

c. **Analyze** the primary ways the United States achieves Unified Action.

3. Enabling Outcome. **Comprehend** the complex relationship the Department of Defense and specifically, the geographic and functional combatant commander, has with his/her interagency counterparts as well as the unique role he/she has in implementing national military strategy to achieve political effects.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the “points to consider,” and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue concerning the role of the President, Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders, and interagency leaders in achieving unified action and comprehensive political-strategic effect.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper – Interorganizational Coordination*, Fourth Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_ia_coord.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read pp. 1-20. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read Chapter II, “Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces,” paragraph 3, “Unified Action,” sections a, b and c on pages II-8 and II-9. Also, paragraph 10, “Interagency Coordination,” pages II-13 to II-20. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) Gabriel Marcella, *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/ssi_marcella.pdf (accessed July 31, 2017). Read Chapter 5, “Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or the Essence of Indecision,” by William J. Olson, pp. 215-252. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Oct 12, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read “Executive Summary” and “Commanders Overview,” ix through xviii. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(5) U.S. Department of State, “Integrated Country Strategy Overview,” May 2012. **[Blackboard]**

c. Focused Readings. (for a student presentation)

(1) Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, *All Elements of National Power – Moving Toward a New Interagency Balance for U.S. Global Engagement* (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Counsel of the United States, July, 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/All_Elements_of_National_Power.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read Executive Summary and pp. 1-12. **[Open Source URL]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Harry Tomlin, “Speaking with One Voice,” Occasional Paper, September 10, 2010, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, U.S. Army War College. **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Department of Defense, *3D Planning Guide – Diplomacy, Development, Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Department of Defense, July 31, 2012), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/3D%20Planning%20Guide_Update_FINAL%20%2831%20Jul%2012%29.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read pages 4-26. **[Open Source URL]**

(3) U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, “Integrated Country Strategy Guidance & Instructions,” July 2012, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAA879.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). Read pp. 1-13. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. Given the current division between functional commands with global responsibilities and geographic commands with regional responsibilities, what is the potential for mission overlap and institutional impediments to unity of effort?

b. What are the characteristics of the interagency that influence the combatant commander and the development/execution of Theater Strategy?

c. What are some of the challenge areas in attaining interagency coordination and unified action?

d. What are some shortcomings of the current combatant command structure with regard to unified action across the DIME, and what are some possible options for organizational reform to underpin the comprehensive approach?

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN THEATER

Mode: Seminar/Panel Discussion

Lesson: TSC-17-S

1. Introduction. Today's class builds upon our previous session that focused on how civilian and military leaders integrate their efforts within Washington to develop and integrate U.S. policy and strategy objectives through integrated, coordinated interagency planning and coordination both before and during crisis. Building upon your understanding of the roles and organization of the "interagency" at the national level thus far, we will explore how the impacts of "organizational culture," differing design and planning approaches, etc are dealt with by the combatant commands as they synchronize their overall theater campaign plan with the ongoing efforts of the U.S. Country Teams across their AORs.

a. The current complexities of the operational environment and evolving challenges by irregular and non-state actors have placed a premium on developing cohesive, integrated efforts across the JIIM partners for strategic success. Thus, the combatant commander's efforts to integrate DoD efforts with those of other U.S. agencies is accomplished through effective teamwork with the U.S. Ambassador and "Chief of Mission," (CoM) and the supporting interagency "country team" across the AOR. In all, the challenges of bringing together civilian and military efforts at the national level extend to the country levels as well, to include bringing together diverse agency partners that are influenced and guided by their own "organizational culture" which drives the way they view the problems, interpret guidance, and frame options for "integrated" responses to instability and conflict. We will analyze the organization and collaborative efforts of a country team, and how the development and implementation of an integrated country strategy are designed to focus and orient team efforts across diplomacy, development, and defense (3D), and discuss the challenges of bridging across organizational cultures to improve civil-military cooperation in conflict environments.

During the first half of the lesson, we will examine the practical approaches and challenges of how the CoM and country team would coordinate efforts during both peace and violent conflict within a partner nation. Given a fictional scenario a "mock" country team panel will be convened in Will Washcoe Auditorium to present their views on how they would work together to accomplish key elements of an integrated country strategy. Members will include:

- U.S. Ambassador who will discuss the role of the CoM in conducting diplomatic relations with the host-nation government, and leading integrated USG efforts in the country team

- Foreign Assistance Mission Director, USAID who will discuss their role in directing foreign assistance and development efforts, along with emergency disaster and humanitarian responses, that support CoM efforts.

- Director for Security Assistance for a major office of military cooperation, who will discuss DoD efforts to build host nation security capacity and coordination of program and exercise programs that support security development objectives.

While they will focus on how the team operates during ongoing (peacetime) operations, panel members will also discuss 1) how they view effective relations with the GCC and the ongoing theater campaign plan, and 2) how they would view the deployment of military forces and initiation of operations into their country during a crisis situation [given the fictional scenario provided].

Selected seminar members will attend and participate in a question-and-answer session following the panel presentation in WWA, while the remainder of seminar members will view the presentation via webcast in their seminar rooms.

b. In the second half of today's lesson, the seminar will discuss how the geographic combatant commands organize for and focus their ongoing efforts through the development and conduct of their theater campaign plan that guides ongoing joint operations and operations of their Service Component Commands to maintain regional/local stability and deter potential conflicts through security cooperation, military engagement, foreign humanitarian assistance, deterrence efforts across the range of military operations (ROMO). We will also discuss how the GCC's organize and coordinate efforts to ensure collaboration and synchronization through interagency representatives working within the command.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the different planning and execution cultures of the agencies with equities in national security policy and implementation.

b. **Analyze** the primary actors, processes and challenges that facilitate the synchronization and implementation of national strategy between the geographical combatant commanders and the various Chiefs of Mission across the countries of the AOR.

c. **Analyze** the primary ways military efforts support and enable Unified Action under Chief of Mission authority at the country team level to achieve and maintain security and stability within a host nation during pre-conflict through post-conflict periods

3. Enabling Outcome. **Comprehend** that the combatant command is developing and conducting ongoing, effective civil-military integration of DoD/military efforts that accomplish the commander's theater strategy and enable USG security policy success across the AOR.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the “points to consider,” and be prepared to contribute to learning through the development of questions and enabling senior leader-student dialogue on the principles for and challenges to effective, integrated interagency efforts at the country team level.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed August 1, 2017). Read pp. V-1 to V-16 “Joint Ops Across the Conflict Continuum.” **[Open Source URL]** **[Blackboard]**

(2) Review: U.S. Department of State, “Integrated Country Strategy Guidance and Instructions,” (Washington, DC: Department of State, May 2012) http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAA879.pdf (accessed August 1, 2017). **[Open Source URL]** **[Blackboard]**

(3) Ronald E Neumann, “Demystifying the Interagency Process and Explaining the Ambassador’s Role” *Interagency Journal* 6, no. 3 (Summer, 2015) <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IAJ-6-3-Summer-2015.pdf> (accessed August 1, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) United States Institute for Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding_principles_full.pdf (accessed August 1, 2017). Read Section 2, “Strategic Framework” and Section 3, “Cross Cutting Principles.” **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Tamara K. Fitzgerald, *After the Fall of North Korea – A Post-Conflict Stability Operations Exercise – A Case Study*, Case Study # 0617-03, PKSOI Trends Global Case Study Series (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute). Read case study and attached slide deck. **[Blackboard]**

(6) Power Point slide deck, “TSC-08: Unified Action – Theater and Country Level Integration.” **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Robert Perito, ed., *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007). Read sections on “Coordination in Washington and the Field,” “U.S. Diplomatic Mission Structure,” and “Characteristics of Civilian Officials,” pp. 197-205.

(2) Institute for Land Warfare, “The U.S. Army in Motion in the Pacific” *Association of the United States Army* (April, 2015) <https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/TBIP-2015-The-US-Army-in-Motion-in-the-Pacific.pdf> (accessed August 1, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Matthew C. Weed and Nina M. Serafino, "U.S. Diplomatic Missions: Background and Issues on Chief of Mission Authority," (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 14, 2014) <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751906> (accessed August 1, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) United States Agency for International Development, "Conflict Assessment Framework," Version 2.0 (USAID, June 2012), <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications> (accessed August 1, 2017). Document found under "Conflict Assessment and Analysis" section. **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Terrence K. Kelly, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, et al, *Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success* Terrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010) http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR734.pdf (accessed August 1, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Harry A. Tomlin, *USEUCOM Theater Strategic Level IA Planning Handbook*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012).

5. Points to Consider.

a. The country team is the embodiment of the interagency process at the local/host nation level; based upon our previous discussions, what are the key efforts and challenges that military leaders face in working effectively with our non-DoD partners?

b. How does the combatant commander and his designated security assistance efforts work effectively with the Chief of Mission and Mission Director for USAID to accomplish joint and DoD priorities at the local level?

c. How can our joint doctrine/concepts for "stability" in joint operations enable us to better understand ongoing country team efforts? How do those same joint doctrine concepts prepare us to design and plan efforts that retain or restore stability during rising violent conflict?

d. What are the key leader attributes and personal competencies that effective military leaders must have in working within a country team?

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-18-S

1. Introduction.

a. As early as the American Revolution, and in particular during the Yorktown Campaign (1781), the United States has engaged in wars and conflicts as part of multinational efforts. As stated in the National Security Strategy, in subsequent department strategies, and in military doctrine, the United States will continue to confront security challenges in a multinational manner.

b. There are at least three reasons why nations conduct multinational operations: to achieve common policy aims; to distribute military tasks, responsibilities, and resource burdens; and to provide political legitimacy for military action that is required by the international community. Purely military benefits of multinational operations may be, at times, insignificant to U.S. conduct of war, but the political advantages of multinational operations can be substantial in allowing the operation to increase legitimacy and support in a skeptical world.

c. The two principal manifestations of multinational operations are alliances and coalitions. Some argue that in an increasingly complex and globalized security environment coalitions will be the most prevalent form of multinational operations. However, unity of effort remains essential to mission success. While critical for success, unity of effort can also be difficult to achieve and maintain. History is replete with examples of salient tensions between stated multinational goals and competing national interests.

d. The U.S. Army War College can draw upon distinctive experience from its International Fellows, composed of 79 officers from 76 nations. Their experiences in multinational operations are a great source of insight and knowledge about coalition warfare. Over a full year, they also expose U.S. students to foreign cultures, practices and traditions, which offers great opportunity to improve mutual interoperability.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the characteristics of alliances and coalitions and evaluate their inherent strengths and weaknesses.

b. **Evaluate** the opportunities and challenges of multinational operations and command structures in potential future crises.

c. **Analyze** best practices and lessons learned for future multinational exercises and operations.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the importance of assured interoperability with all its features for any successful conduct of multinational operations.

b. **Know** about friction in previous multinational operation and understand the resulting effects on mission success.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings with frequent reference to both learning outcomes and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various actors as reflected in the processes and products.

(3) (International Fellows only) Be prepared to present and discuss your armed forces' specific culture, tradition and procedures as well as your experiences in multinational operations as directed by your TSC Faculty Instructor.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf (accessed July 25, 2017). Read "Executive Summary," ix-xxviii; and Chapter I. Scan Chapter II. **[Open Source URL]**
[Blackboard]

(2) Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete, eds, *Coalition Warfare – An Uneasy Accord* (Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983). Read Chapter 1, "Military Coalitions and Coalitions Warfare Over the Past Century," by Paul Kennedy, pp. 3-15.
[Blackboard]

(3) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Case Studies in Joint Functions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2013). Read "Operation Allied Force: NATO and U.S. Operations in Kosovo." **[Blackboard]**

(4) Michael Codner, *Hanging Together: Military Interoperability in an Era of Technological Innovation*, Whitehall Paper 56 (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 2003), [Taylor Francis Online](#) (accessed July 25, 2017). Read Chapters: "The Dimensions of Interoperability," pp. 29-33, and "Behavioral Interoperability," pp. 51-67. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Richard Cobbold, "RUSI Interview with General David Richards," *RUSI Journal* 152, no. 2 (April 2007), [Proquest](#) (accessed July 25, 2017). Read pp. 24-32. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(2) Bart Howard, "Preparing Leaders for Multinational Operations," *Army* 58, no. 3 (March 2008), [Proquest](#) (accessed July 25, 2017). Read pp. 21-24. **[USAWC Library Online Database]**

(3) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Alfred D. Chandler, ed, *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years III* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970). Read "Memorandum for an Allied Command. For Lord Louis Mountbatten," pp. 1420-1424.

(4) Robert Selig, *March to Victory: Washington, Rochambeau, and the Yorktown Campaign of 1781* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2007), http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/rochambeau/CMH_70-104-1.pdf (accessed July 25, 2017). Read "Introduction" and pp. 3-12. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. A multinational approach to an emerging security problem presents both opportunities and challenges. What are the fundamental reasons for and advantages of multinational operations as well as their disadvantages, restraints, and constraints?

b. What are the major factors to consider when participating within an ad hoc coalition versus operations executed by an alliance? How should senior political and military leaders command and manage coalitions?

c. Are there any characteristics of multinational operations that transcend time and geography? If so, what are they and why are they persistent?

d. Under what conditions would multinational operations *not* be advisable?

e. How do commanders deal with participating nations that do not use mission-type orders and do not have a military culture based on initiative and independent action?

f. Which interoperability issues might cause the greatest friction for the strategic level?

g. How can a lack of interoperability endanger mission success in a coalition? How can a commander mitigate this friction?

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Block IV Intent “Campaign Analysis”

Block Chief: Dr. Paul Jussel

Purpose: Block IV uses Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR to examine the integration of joint functions using a modern campaign (post Goldwater-Nichols). Block IV highlights how the integration and application of the Joint Functions serve to support the accomplishment of the geographical combatant commander’s ends through the Joint Planning Process.

Method: This module features student readings, seminar instruction, an in-depth case study, and student oral presentations on selected readings in support of Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs), and Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs).

End state: Students should proceed from this block with an understanding of how the integration and application of the joint functions through the Joint Planning Process supports the achievement of the geographical combatant commander’s mission.

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THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS: GETTING IN (PRINCIPLES OF JOINT PLANNING)

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-19-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to analyze the joint planning process (JPP) and comprehend its relationship to operational design and operational art. Together, these relationships and procedures establish the intellectual framework that guide the remainder of this block of lessons.

b. This lesson weaves together your understanding of previous lessons on operational design and operational art through the JPP to find potential solutions for complex and unfamiliar problems. The JPP is how the joint planning and execution community ultimately converts the results of operational art and operational design into clear effects, objectives, and tasks for members of the joint force. The JPP is not simply service doctrine with a broader, multi-Service perspective; there are similarities, but there are also key differences. Joint planning takes place at strategic and operational levels which deal with far greater ambiguity, unclear national-level guidance, and ill-structured problems. The JPP also serves as a common language for problem solving across the entire joint force, driving unity of effort deeper into plans and orders.

c. The JPP, while a military planning process, is very similar to both civilian problem solving processes and the military decision making process. In addition to gaining a better understanding of what the JPP is, this lesson will analyze the opening steps of the JPP: planning initiation and mission analysis. These steps provide a coherent model for employing operational design for both problem solving and plan development, setting the stage for integrating joint functions and prudently employing the instruments of national power to attain multinational, national, and theater end states and objectives. We will also consider how these might influence subsequent planning steps: course of action (COA) development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, COA approval, and plan or order development in a later lesson. Further, the seminar will explore the relationship between emergent, crisis-generated planning and more deliberate planning for likely contingencies within the APEX system, for example, where preexisting contingency plans are thin or nonexistent, as in Operation Joint Endeavor (Implementation Force for Bosnia).

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the JPP as a problem-solving process and how it relates to and benefits from operational design and operational art and aids the synchronization of joint functions.

b. **Evaluate** the relevance of mission analysis activities at the theater strategic level of command (combatant commander or other joint force commander).

c. **Apply** the joint planning process (JPP) as a problem-solving process in comparison or contrast to the NATO experience in Operation Joint Endeavor (IFOR in Bosnia).

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Understand** operational design and operational art.

b. **Understand** the nature and roles of joint functions.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Master the enabling outcomes in paragraph 3 through required readings and personal research.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 2017), https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed 25 July 2017). Scan the Executive Summary, pp. xi to xxx. Read Chapter V, Joint Planning Process, pp. V-1 to V-20. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook, AY 18* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018). Review Chapter 2, "Joint Planning," pp. 27-33, and read Chapter 4, "Joint Planning Process," pp. 81 to 97 and review Chapter 3 on operational design. **[DMSPO Issue] [Blackboard]**

(3) William B. Buchanan et al., *Operation Joint Endeavor – Description and Lessons Learned (Planning and Deployment Phases)* (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, November 1996). Scan Chapter I, "Operation Joint Endeavor – Background," pp. I-1 to I-14. Read Chapter II, "Operation Joint Endeavor - Political-Military Aspects, pp. II-1 to II-13, and also read Chapter III, "Operation Joint Endeavor Planning, pp. III-1 to III-26. **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide 3130, *Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework* (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 May 2015), <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Handbooks/g3130.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175741-677> (accessed 25 July 2017). Read Enclosure A, "Adaptive Planning and Execution," pp. A-1 to A-7. **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Larry K. Wentz, ed, *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., 1997). Read Chapter II, "Setting the Stage," pp. 9-33, and scan Chapter III, "Command and Control Structure," pp. 35-52.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the differences and similarities between the JPP at the CCMD level and any tactical-level planning process?

b. How would you characterize the relationship and dependencies between operational design, operational art, the joint functions, and the JPP?

c. In what ways do operational art and operational design function during the JPP?

d. How do the two initial steps of the JPP (panning initiation and mission analysis) shape the outcomes and end states envisioned in the planning process?

e. This 16 June 2017 iteration of Joint Pub 5-0 eliminates the concepts of deliberate planning and crisis action planning from the JPP lexicon, subsuming both categories into the general APEX enterprise. What are the benefits of this new approach? What are the drawbacks?

f. How does the JPP accept and adapt strategic guidance and apply the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise to produce planning products applicable to the difficult combatant command planning task of prioritizing ends, ways, and means?

g. How is the JPP applicable to problems that do not lend themselves to the clear use of military force? Is interagency coordination properly accounted for in the JPP so that planning incorporates all elements of national power?

INTELLIGENCE; COMMAND AND CONTROL

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-20-S

1. Introduction. This lesson focuses on two joint functions: Intelligence and Command & Control. The intelligence portion links to the earlier National Security Policy and Strategy Lesson 11 on the instruments of national power in conflict. Effective intelligence support is foundational to a focused and nuanced application of the instruments of national power.

a. Command Structures. The command and control (C2) joint function is essential as C2 must be established before any operation begins. Yet, too often, the analysis is done quickly, the units are thrown together, and the command structure is inadequate. An understanding of how to organize a joint headquarters, to implement control measures, and staff planning mitigates the fog and friction of operations. Dr. Bonin will begin the lesson with a Bliss Hall session on C2 at 0830.

b. Intelligence. This lesson also analyzes intelligence with an emphasis on the scope and depth of intelligence support to the combatant commander (CCDR), though much is also applicable to other joint force commanders (JFC). The CCDR provides guidance, prioritization, and feedback to ensure that joint intelligence effectively enhances understanding of the operational environment (OE) at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels across the theater. The J-2 leads the CCMD intelligence enterprise, integrating capabilities assigned to the CCMD, the Service components, multinational partners, and within the greater Intelligence Community (IC). Lessons learned from recent operations have resulted in CCMD intelligence capabilities that are better integrated and collaborative, which enables the CCDR to assess the developing situation and inform his decisions on the employment of military forces

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Evaluate** the command authorities of a combatant commander and command relationships with subordinate components and how these affect theater organization.

b. **Analyze** the CCDR's role and key considerations in the planning, integration, synchronization, and execution of intelligence as a joint function across the area of responsibility.

c. **Analyze** the two joint functions in the context of Operation Joint Endeavor for their respective successes and failures in application.

3. Enabling Outcomes. To prepare for seminar:

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal terms and options used for organizing a theater of operations.

b. **Comprehend** the command authorities available to a joint force commander.

c. **Comprehend** the intelligence resources and capabilities available to the CCDR.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings with frequent referral to both learning objectives and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various actors as reflected in the processes and products.

b. Required Readings

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Read Chapter IV, "Joint Command Organizations," pp. IV-1 to IV-10; and Chapter V, "Joint Command and Control," pp. V-1 to V-10. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Read Chapter III, "Joint Functions," "Command and Control," III-2 to III-13. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, Joint Publication 3-31 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 24, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_31.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Read Chapter II, "The Joint Force Land Component Command," pp. II-1 to II-13. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Read pp. III-23 - III-25. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication 2-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 22, 2013) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Read pp. ix - xi, xiv - xvi, I-6 - I-8, and III-1 - III-13. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(6) Larry K. Wentz ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997). Read pp. 53-61. **[Blackboard]**

(7) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, Joint Publication 3-31 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 24, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_31.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Read Chapter IV, "C2 Considerations in Land Operations," point 3, pp. IV-8 to IV-9. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

c. Focused Reading. Larry K. Wentz ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997). Scan pp. 35-52. **[Blackboard]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Publication 3-33 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 30, 2012), www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_33.pdf (accessed August 28, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, Deployable Training Division, "Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Geographic Combatant Commanders Command and Control Organizational Options," (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, March 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_gcc.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Pp 1-12. **[Open Source URL]**

(3) James R. Clapper, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2014*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, September 17, 2014), http://www.odni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Intelligence Operations, First Edition (Reprint)*, (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff J7, Deployable Training Division, July 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_intel_ops.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Read pp. 1-12. **[Open Source URL]**

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, Joint Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 5, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf (accessed July 18, 2017). Read pp. I-1 - I-5, II-1 - II-6, II-24 - II-27. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are a combatant commander's options to organize the joint force, and what are the authorities and command relationships that affect it?

b. What are a combatant commander's options to organize the multinational or coalition force, and what are the authorities and command relationships that affect it?

c. Describe OPCON, TACON, and supporting/supported relationships.

d. What circumstances influence the way a joint force commander would organize U.S. force components by service, by function, or a combination of the two?

e. Using the Bosnia case study, describe the challenges the joint force command faced and how it solved/did not solve the control issues through the command structure used.

f. How does the CCDR provide the guidance, prioritization, and feedback essential to the ability of joint intelligence to facilitate understanding the operational environment and ensure mission accomplishment?

g. How does the J-2 lead and synchronize the CCMD intelligence enterprise, to include the Service components, in support of joint and multinational operations?

h. How do CCDRs and their J-2s leverage external strategic intelligence resources, capabilities, and information in support of the range of military operations?

i. How did the Opn Joint Endeavor commander and J-2 adjust to challenges working across multiple organizations/nations and echelons in support of joint and multinational operations? How has this changed since 1995?

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER, AND FIRES

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-21-S

1. Introduction.

a. Movement and Maneuver as well as Fires are common to joint operations at all levels of war and across the range of military operations. Movement and maneuver encompasses the deployment and employment of joint forces to conduct campaigns, major operations, and other contingencies, specifically achieving both operational reach and positional advantage before combat operations commence. Movement incorporates joint force projection which delivers joint forces to theater. Successful maneuver utilizes surprise, speed, and momentum to gain situational or psychological dominance over the enemy to maximize the effect of fires. Joint fires from two or more components, both lethal and non-lethal, produce desired effects in support of a common objective. These fire tasks include targeting, joint fire support, countering air/missile threats, interdicting enemy capabilities, conducting strategic attack, and employing information operations capabilities.

b. A significant challenge for the joint force commander (JFC) is in the planning, sophistication, and coordination required to integrate multi-service and coalition capabilities most effectively. The mutual support and cooperation of subordinate air, land, and maritime component commanders, as well as special operations commanders, cyber, and space assets are vital to achieve joint synergy and subsequent mission success.

c. This lesson will examine the joint functions of Movement and Maneuver, as well as Fires, to demonstrate the complexity in planning and integrating these functions. Accomplished through the lens of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, these functions are much more than sending rounds down range, particularly in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** the implications of applying Movement and Maneuver, and Fires in diverse operating environments, across all domains, at the theater strategic level.

b. **Analyze** the two joint functions in the context of Operation Joint Endeavor for their respective successes and failures in application.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the key considerations and challenges requisite in the planning, integration, and synchronization of the joint functions Movement and Maneuver, and Fires.

b. **Comprehend** the JFC's role in the application of the joint functions at the theater/campaign level across the spectrum of conflict.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the "Points to Consider," and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue concerning the role and application of movement, maneuver, and fires in the conduct of operations or a campaign.

b. Required Readings.

(1) US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017)
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed August 8, 2017). Read: "Fires" and "Movement and Maneuver," III-26 through III-35 and V-7 through V-20. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) William Buchanan, et al, *Operation Joint Endeavor – Description and Lessons Learned Planning and Deployment Phases*, IDA Paper P-3210 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, November 1996). Read Chapter IV, "Operation Joint Endeavor Deployment," IV-1 thru IV-25. SCAN Chapter V, "Details of the Joint Endeavor Deployment," V-1 thru V-29. **[Blackboard]**

(3) **SCAN:** Eric Larson, Gustav Lindstrom, Myron Hura, et al, *Interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied Air Forces: Supporting Data and Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2003)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1603.pdf (accessed September 5, 2017). Read Chapter 3, "Lessons Learned in Some Recent Coalition Operations," pp. 22-45. **[Open Source URL]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, Joint Publication 3-35, Final Coordination Draft (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 June 30, 2017). Read Chapters 3 and 5.

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Fire Support*, Joint Publication 3-9, (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 12, 2014). Read III-1 through III-12

5. Points to Consider.

a. How are these two functions integrated into the phasing model in the recent edition of JP 3-0? How does the current phasing model affect the logic of these functions?

b. What are the relationships between movement and operational reach as well as maneuver and a position of advantage? What are the strategic implications for the Joint Force attempting to gain and maintain both?

c. What are the key considerations for the integration and synchronization of non-lethal and lethal fires with movement and maneuver in various operational environments?

d. How does the application of movement, maneuver and fires differ across the spectrum of conflict and from traditional warfare to irregular warfare to peacekeeping?

e. What were the challenges for USEUCOM as it prepared and deployed its components to the area of operations in relation to movement and maneuver?

f. From the JP 3-0 reading on fires, it is obvious that many fires tasks were not that important during OJE. Yet the tasks associated with non-lethal fires were important: counter threat finance, cyber activities, electronic warfare, MISO, and non-lethal weapons use. What challenges did the service components face when working to incorporate these activities into their plans?

SUSTAINMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONTRACTING SUPPORT

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-22-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson provides an introduction to the discussion of the joint function, Sustainment, its related tasks, and key planning considerations. The lesson also introduces the requirements and challenges in establishing/setting and supporting/sustaining a military theater of operations. Senior U.S. military officers often face restraints and constraints in applying the right force mix, timing, and resources needed to set a theater of operations quickly and effectively. We need to be ready for any future contingency environment to include the ability to execute rapid response with minimal staging, extended operational reach, and prolonged endurance. The commander is the individual who must ultimately balance the competing elements of mission, time, resources, capabilities, and risk. The commander's vision and intent for the campaign or operation provides the foundation upon which everything else rests.

b. Sustainment operations enable the continuity and survivability of a military force capable of avoiding or withstanding hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. Sustainment must be capable of supporting sustained high-tempo operations to achieve objectives with numerous partners in future complex, uncertain, and austere environments, often at the ends of extended and contested lines of communications, requires the ability to operate in multiple domains with reduced vulnerability to interdiction. While Sustainment remains a Service responsibility, there are exceptions such as arrangements described in Service support agreements, CCDR-directed common-user logistics lead Service, or DoD agency responsibilities.

d. Operational Contract Support (OCS) is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the joint force within a designated operational area. It also includes the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. The *Joint Operational Contract Support (OCS) Essentials for Commanders and Staff (JOECS)* course provides essential foundational information on the evolution, purpose, principles, authorities, and challenges of integrating, supporting and managing OCS. The course consists of two primary modules. We will use Module 1 which describes the OCS joint capability area, key terminology, history, principles, planning requirements, and basic roles and responsibilities.

e. Today's lesson will explore the planning considerations associated with setting and sustaining a military theater. Sustainment and OCS planning is not just the

responsibility of the Service logistician or contracting officer. The Joint Force Commander, J5, J4, and J3 all have a key and essential role to play in developing the vision for the theater. Operational design provides the initial approach to the theater set, from which planners, logisticians, and subordinate units create detailed plans utilizing the Joint Planning Process (JPP).

f. The focused readings illustrate the challenges faced and lessons learned during Operation Joint Endeavor.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the mission and responsibilities of a CCDR for planning, setting, and maintaining a theater and JOA.

b. **Assess** the impact of current contracting requirements on theater operations.

c. Using the Joint Endeavor case study, **analyze** the challenges associated with planning and executing sustainment in a theater of operation.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal foundation and underpinnings of the Joint functions.

b. **Comprehend** the totality of the theater, i.e. infrastructure, bases, ports, distribution systems, protection, and C2, and the responsibilities of the ACSS and GCC in its development and operation.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Self-Paced Tutorial. **(U.S. Students Only)** “Joint OCS *Essentials for Commanders and Staffs (JOECS)*, J4OP-US380A (Phase 1)” <https://jkodirect.jten.mil/Atlas2/page/desktop/DesktopHome.jsf> **It will take you approximately 1 hour to go through the course.**

(1) After clicking link above, log in with your CAC. It will take you to the JKO homepage. Click on the “Course Catalog” tab.

(2) In the “Partial Course #” block type “US380A” and click the purple “Search” icon. That title will come up as *Joint OCS Essentials for Commanders and Staff (JOECS) Phase 1 (1 hr)*. Click “Enroll.” A small window will open to ask if you want to enroll. Click “Continue.”

(3) A black header will scroll down to indicate you are now enrolled. Click on the “My Training” tab at the top of the page and you’ll see the course listed at the bottom of the page. Click “Launch.”

(4) A new window will open with an explanation of all the tabs and buttons used throughout the course.

(5) On the top left side of that new page click on the title “Start” button and the course will start. You will need to click on the six module links on the left side of the page and complete each to finish the course.

(6) After completion, print your certificate and turn in to your FI.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Logistics*, Joint Publication 4-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 16, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf (accessed July 22, 2016). Read pp. I-1 through I-11, II-1 through II-2, II-7 through II-12, and III-1 through III-15. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed September 12, 2016). Read pp. III-42 through III-48. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, Joint Publication 4-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_10.pdf (accessed August 2, 2017). Read pp. ix through xvii. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Department of the Army, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, Field Manual 3-94 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 21, 2014). Read pp. 2-1 to 2-4 and 2-8 to 2-15. **[Blackboard]**

(5) U.S. Department of the Army, *Theater Army Operations*, ATP 3-93 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2014) https://armypubs.us.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp3_93.pdf (accessed August 7, 2017). Read pp. 5-1 to 5-2 and scan pp. 6-1 to 6-10. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

c. Focused Readings/Student Presentations.

(1) Kenneth Gaines and Reginald Snell, “Setting and Supporting the Theater,” *Army Sustainment Magazine*, (Nov/Dec 2015) <https://www.army.mil/article/157230> (accessed August 2, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Center For Army Lessons Learned, *Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle Initial Operations*, FOUO (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, May 1996). **[Instructor Will Distribute]**

(3) Center For Army Lessons Learned, *B/H CAAT 2 Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle, Continuing Operations*, FOUO (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 1996). **[Instructor Will Distribute]**

(4) Center For Army Lessons Learned, *B/H CAAT 3/4 Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations*, FOUO (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, March 1997). **[Instructor Will Distribute]**

(5) Center For Army Lessons Learned, *CAAT 10 Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, RSOI, Title 10 Sustainment and Force Protection*, FOUO (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 1996). **[Instructor Will Distribute]**

(6) United States Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, "Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform 2012 Update," Report No, DODIG-2012-134, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 18, 2012), <http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy12/DODIG-2012-134.pdf> (accessed July 22, 2016). Read Appendix E, pp. 56-59. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 4-08 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 21, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_08.pdf (accessed August 7, 2017). Read "Executive Summary." **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Joseph T. Boos, "Developing a Multinational Logistics Common Operational Picture," *Army Sustainment Magazine Online*, September-October 2015, http://www.army.mil/article/153756/Developing_a_multinational_logistics_common_operational_picture/ (accessed July 22, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Theresa D. Christie, "Multinational Logistics Interoperability," *Army Sustainment Magazine Online*, September-October 2015, <http://go.usa.gov/3625Y> (accessed July 25, 2016). **[Open Source URL]**

(4) Department of Defense Executive Agent List, <http://dod-executiveagent.osd.mil/agentList.aspx> (accessed July 25, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

- a. What is the role of Sustainment in establishing and maintaining a theater?
- b. How should commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize U.S. forces, contractors, host-nation (HN)/Coalition assets, other governmental agencies (OGA), and non-governmental agencies (NGO), in a theater?
- c. What are the different challenges/considerations to setting and maintaining both a mature and immature theater of operation?
- d. What are the consequences of insufficient oversight and planning regarding Operational Contracting Support?

PROTECTION AND INFORMATION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-23-S

1. Introduction. The purpose of this lesson is to analyze the two joint functions of Protection and Information.

a. Protection. The Joint Function of Protection focuses on preserving the fighting potential of the joint force. The basic approach to this is twofold. First, using active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and Lines of Communication (LOCs) from enemy attack. Second, using passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This is frequently expanded to include designated non-combatants, systems, and infrastructure of friendly nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other government agencies (OGAs). Protection considerations impact the planning of joint operations at all levels and involve a wide range of protection tasks executed across the range of military operations. Overall, multiple layers of protection for joint forces and facilities at all levels, beginning at home, enable freedom of action from pre-deployment through employment and redeployment. The fluid OE, with the ability of adversaries to orchestrate threats against joint forces, necessitates that the CCDR seek all available means of protection.

b. Information Operations. On July 12th, 2017, CJCS, General Dunford, approved Information as the 7th Joint Function and on September 15th, 2017, SECDEF, James Mattis, released a memo endorsing Information as a Joint Function. Elevating "Information" to the status of a Joint Function requires the JFC to incorporate it into all areas/activities of joint planning and execution efforts. Since information permeates all levels of the joint planning processes and execution efforts, it is imperative that the JFC recognize the important role that information contributes or detracts from each and every action. Information is not just a byproduct of an event but an integral part of any activity. Information needs to be managed and applied in such a way as to aid in the success of the JFC's objectives.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** the CCDR's role and key considerations in the planning and implementation of protection measures into a theater campaign.

b. **Analyze** the protection joint function in the context of Operation Joint Endeavor for its respective successes and failures in application.

c. **Analyze** the information function and how it helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its

application during all military operations.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the CCDR's role and responsibilities for protection across the Joint Security Area.

b. **Comprehend** the elements of the information environment, the challenges of operating in the information environment, and the importance of incorporating information into all aspects of the joint planning and execution processes.

c. **Comprehend** how the JFC integrates information across all of the Joint Functions and into both the planning and execution of operations.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings with frequent referral to both learning outcomes and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various actors as reflected in the processes and products.

b. Required Readings (Protection).

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed October 18, 2017). Read pp. III-35 to III-42. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, Joint Publication 3-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 13, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_10.pdf (accessed July 29, 2017). Read pp. I-1 to I-8. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(3) Dr. Harold E. Raugh, Jr., "Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR V Corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995-1996, An Oral History" (Combat Studies Institute Press: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 2010), <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/OperationJointEndeavor.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2017). Read "Interview with Major Kenneth O. McCreedy, Chief, Plans and Exercises, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR" pp. 149-160. **[Open Source URL]**

- Required Readings (Information).

(4) U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, "Information Joint Function," memorandum, Washington, DC, September 15, 2017. **[Blackboard]**

(5) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Information Paper regarding Joint Function Approval, Washington, DC, dated May 22, 2017. **[Blackboard]**

(6) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, undated draft document). Read draft Information Joint Function chapter. **[Blackboard]**

(7) Megan Burns, "Information Warfare: What and How?," *Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science*, (1999), <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~burnsm/InfoWarfare.html> (accessed October 17, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(8) Jim Rutenberg, "RT, Sputnik and Russia's New Theory of War," *The New York Times Magazine Online*, (September 13, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/rt-sputnik-and-russias-new-theory-of-war.html> (accessed October 17, 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings (Protection).

(1) Richard E. Berkebile, "Thoughts on Force Protection," *Joint Force Quarterly* 81, (2nd Quarter 2016), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-81.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2018). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Protection*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-37 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 2012, Incorporating Change 1, February 28, 2013), http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp3_37.pdf (accessed July 29, 2017). Read Chapter 1, pp. 1-1 through 1-3. Scan Chapter 1, pp. 1-4 thru 1-15. Read Chapter 4, pp. 4-1 through 4-4. **[Open Source URL]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the ways that a JFC preserves the joint force fighting potential?

b. Discuss the tasks that make up the protection joint function.

c. How does a CDR conduct military Joint Security Operations (JSO) across an area of responsibility outside the homeland?

d. What are key considerations in the planning and implementation of JSOs across the range of military operations?

e. What are the key elements and considerations that make up the Information Joint Function?

f. How do joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate information into all levels of planning and execution?

g. How do JFCs prioritize information planning and execution across all joint functions?

h. What makes up the information environment? How do you manage all the elements that make up the information environment?

i. Discuss the current day challenges that make up the information and the information environment.

THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS: JPP II & TRANSITION (IFOR TO SFOR)

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-24-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to complete the examination of the Joint Planning Process (JPP). It will explore how selected COAs turn into OPLANs and are synchronized across the government. We will also see how operational design continues to be an important methodology as crises emerge or evolve.

b. Once a COA is selected and approved, the most significant challenge comes as the final details are worked out not only with military headquarters, but also with civilian agencies and organizations. An essential part of this process is the consideration of the joint functions in the detailed planning process, as the JPP moves through the steps of course of action (COA) development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, COA approval, and plan or order development. The lesson will also explore the socialization process throughout the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Beyond the JPEC, the plan may also need to be socialized across a range of joint, interagency and interorganizational, and multinational stake holders. Further, the seminar will explore the transition from emergent, crisis-generated planning to more deliberate planning for likely contingencies within the APEX system using the transition from Operation Joint Endeavor (Implementation force for Bosnia, or IFOR) and Operation Joint Guard (Stabilization Force for Bosnia, or SFOR).

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Analyze** how courses of action developed and analyzed during JPP Steps 3, 4, and 5 are transformed into plans and orders in JPP Steps 6 through 7.

b. **Analyze** how joint functions inform the development of refined courses of action and integrate with ongoing efforts to develop a fully detailed plan from a broad conceptual approach reached in operational design.

c. **Evaluate** the utility of the JPP in emergent planning or plan modification to help the Joint Force Commander and other strategic leaders respond to crises or changing circumstances.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Understand** JPP Steps 6 and 7, particularly with regard to operational assessment.

b. **Understand** how joint functions inform the development of refined courses of action.

c. **Analyze** the linkages between tasks, effects, decisive points, objectives, and end states throughout those final JPP steps.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the “points to consider” below, and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue on the learning outcomes.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 2017), https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed 25 July 2017). Read Chapter V, Joint Planning Process, pp. V-20 to V-62. Scan chapter VI, Operation Assessment, pp. VI-1 to VI-29 and Chapter VII, Transition to Execution, pp VII-1 to VII-6. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(2) Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2017). Read Chapter 4, "Joint Planning Process," pp. 111-137 (JPP Steps 5-7) and Appendix A, "APEX IPR Process," pp. A-1 to A-5. **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard]**

(3) Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, *Operation Joint Guard After Action Report* (Heidelberg, GE: U.S. Army Europe, November 1998). Read Chapter 1, "Introduction," pp. 1-1 to 1-8, and Chapter 2, "Political-Military Considerations," pp. 2-1 to 2-19. Also read Chapter 10, "Conclusions," pp. 10-1 to 10-14. **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Reading. Larry K. Wentz (Ed.). *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., 1997). Read Chapter II, "Setting the Stage," pp. 9-33, and scan Chapter III, "Command and Control Structure," pp. 35-52.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the critical linkages between a contingency plan (as a completed product), the combatant command campaign plan, and the theater security cooperation plan?

b. What are the challenges in coordinating and harmonizing the contingency plan across the whole of government? Across all interested stake holders, including nongovernmental organizations?

c. What are the different aspects of assessing a plan? How was assessment conducted during Operation Joint Endeavor? Operation Joint Guard?

d. How do considerations of risk, time, and future posture influence a CCDR's judgment in the formulation of an operational approach to respond to a crisis?

e. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the JPP during rapidly changing situations or emergent crises? What are key lessons learned from the IFOR to SFOR experience, with regard to transition issues?

f. What is the relationship between planning for emergent crisis and adapting an existing contingency plan within the APEX system and the JPP in particular?

g. What considerations are most salient during the transition from planning to execution? How do emergent crises or rapidly changing circumstances affect the status of a completed contingency plan? What if no on-the-shelf contingency plan exists?

Block V Intent “Tying it all Together”

Block Chief: COL Erik Anderson

Purpose: Provide students the opportunity to synthesize TSC course material presented in previous blocks and apply what they have learned in an Experiential Learning Event (ELE).

Method: Using a notional regional scenario, students demonstrate competence and reinforce confidence by creating a novel operational approach to address a desired national policy objective. Over four days (8 instructional periods) students utilize operational design from the CCDR’s perspective to understand strategic direction and the environment; identify a problem suitable for the application of military power at the theater and operational levels; and articulate an operational approach that promotes Unified Action through the organization of JIIM capabilities, application of joint and service doctrine, and joint function synchronization over time. Additionally, select seminars augment the ELE with a gaming simulation to validate the developed operational approach. Following the ELE, students reflect on their TSC course material competence and its linkage to other SSL core curriculum through faculty facilitated seminar dialogue and course AAR.

End state: Although we are not creating planners, students should possess confidence in and a working knowledge of how Joint Force Commanders integrate Operational Art, Operational Design, and the Joint Functions through the Joint Planning Process to: visualize complex problems; develop solutions promoting Unified Action in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment; and communicate those solutions internally and externally.

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06 February 2018 (0830-1600)
07 February 2018 (0830-1600)
08 February 2018 (0830-1600)
09 February 2018 (0830-1600)

Lesson Author: COL Erik Anderson, 245-3810

EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING EVENT (OPERATIONAL DESIGN EXERCISE AND BRIEFING)

Mode: Exercise

Lessons: TSC-25 EX
TSC-26 EX
TSC-27 EX
TSC-28 EX
TSC-29 EX
TSC-30 EX
TSC-31 EX
TSC-32 EX

1. Introduction. The experiential learning event serves as the Theater Strategy and Campaigning course capstone activity. It provides students an opportunity to contend with complex problems combatant commanders face as they seek to translate national policy objectives into tangible actions and campaigns suitable for military forces. This event reinforces concepts and materials learned throughout TSC.

Building on the situational understanding, problem framing, and option development that occurred during TSC-7 and TSC-8 (Design Practicum I & II), students return to their roles as members of a notional geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) staff. Utilizing operational design, they will refine their environmental understanding based on updated strategic direction, possibly reframe their problem, and develop a detailed operational approach over the course of this four day (24 hour) experiential learning event.

2. Learning Outcomes.

a. **Apply** operational design to understand the GCC's operational environment and frame the hypothetical problem to U.S. national interests in the area of responsibility (AOR).

b. **Synthesize** joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities; joint and service doctrine and concepts; and joint functions to achieve Unified Action toward desired policy objectives over time.

c. **Create** a detailed operational approach that advances U.S. national interests in the hypothetical scenario.

d. **Evaluate** operational design as a way to conceptualize the employment of military forces and develop campaigns to achieve national policy objectives.

3. Enabling Outcomes.

a. **Comprehend** the nature of an ill-structured (“wicked”) problem.

b. **Synthesize** national direction as articulated in the NSS, NMS, GEF and other sources with the strategic environment of the combatant commander.

c. **Synthesize** the role and perspective of the combatant commander in developing military options via the design methodology given a hypothetical regional scenario.

d. **Comprehend** the different planning and execution cultures of the agencies with equities in national security policy and implementation.

e. **Comprehend** best practices and lessons learned for coming multinational exercises and operations.

f. **Understand** operational design and operational art.

g. **Understand** the nature and roles of joint functions.

h. **Comprehend** the doctrinal terms and options used for organizing a theater of operations.

i. **Comprehend** the command authorities available to a joint force commander.

j. **Comprehend** the JFC’s role in the application of the joint functions at the theater/campaign level across the spectrum of conflict.

k. **Comprehend** the totality of the theater, i.e. infrastructure, bases, ports, distribution systems, protection, and C2, and the responsibilities of the ACSS and GCC in its development and operation.

l. **Understand** that a campaign comprises a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) The TSC Southeast Asia Scenario provides the foundational background for the hypothetical regional contingency used throughout this event. Students must be familiar with the scenario to fulfill the experiential learning event objectives.

(2) Working as a Joint Planning Group (JPG) member, students apply operational design as outlined in Joint Publication 5-0 to develop a detailed operational approach to address potential threats to US national interests within the GCC's AOR. Students draw on their initial operational design work completed as part of the Operational Design Practicum during TSC-7 and TSC-8 which resulted in the development of multiple options for an emerging regional contingency. The JPGs will present their respective operational approach at the end of the fourth day.

(4) At the conclusion of the operational approach briefings, students will evaluate operational design as a way for CCDRs to understand the strategic direction and environment and develop tangible activities and campaigns that incorporate JIIM capabilities, joint and service doctrinal concepts, and organize joint functions to achieve Unified Action toward desired policy objectives.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Review: U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018). **[DMSPO Student Issue]**

(2) Review: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 2017), http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf (accessed 24 July 2017). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018). **[DMSPO Student Issue]**

c. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does operational design assist in understanding the environment and addressing complex problems at the theater strategic level?

b. What is the role of the combatant commander in operational design?

c. What are some of the challenges combatant commanders face as they translate national policy goals into tangible action suitable for military forces?

d. How do JIIM capabilities, joint and service concepts and doctrine, and the joint functions contribute to Unified Action and campaign development?

Block V Lesson Directives

COURSE SYNTHESIS AND END-OF-COURSE AAR

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-33-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to assess the students' attainment of Theater Strategy and Campaigning (TSC) course learning outcomes. It is enabled both by the students' papers and the points to consider in the lessons that synthesize key points from the course. The lesson offers an opportunity to review the course outcomes and allows students to share their insights from these outcomes and their course papers. While the emphasis will be on assessing achievement of course learning outcomes, current doctrine and ongoing efforts in current operations may also be discussed.

b. The final hour of this lesson is dedicated to conducting an end-of-course After Action Review (AAR).

2. Learning Outcome. **Evaluate** the students' understanding of the role of strategic and operational art and the employment of the instruments of national power in pursuit of national security goals and strategic objectives.

3. Enabling Outcomes. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Reading. Review TSC course directive, learning outcomes and "points to consider."

5. Points to Consider.

a. As a planner for a geographic or functional combatant commander, identify one contemporary, real-world problem—or propose a reasonable future problem that is consistent with the "Contexts of Future Conflict" in *JOE 2035* (page 21)—that threatens U.S. interests; in accordance with the Integrated Planning Framework, identify whether you anticipate planning as a coordinating authority or a collaborator. Use operational design to develop a broad operational approach to address this threat for presentation to a Deputies Committee of the National Security Council. Considerations for inclusion to the paper include a strategic narrative which describe the current strategic context and a desired future state, an articulation of the problem highlighting the tensions in the system and the impediments to achieving the future state, and an operational approach

that has military objectives, as well as supporting military efforts toward objectives of the other instruments of national power.

b. The United States should assume that for the near future it will exercise military power as a member of a multinational alliance or coalition partners. What are the most significant challenges and opportunities posed to the combatant commander or Joint Force Commander in conducting operations in such an environment in pursuit of national strategic goals and how can he/she best overcome or exploit them?

c. You have studied several new or emerging concepts this year, such as the *Multi-Domain Battle*, *Joint Operational Access Concept*, *Joint Concept for Entry Operations*, and *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*. Select one or more of these concepts (or select another not listed here) and: (1) Use the elements in the CCJO as criteria to evaluate the integration and utility of your chosen concept(s) into existing joint doctrine. (2) Does your emerging concept enable greater jointness, or promote Service parochialism, or both, and why?

d. Discuss the relevant interdependencies of transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional as they relate to the application of Landpower anywhere in the world. Highlight the unique role of Landpower in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment, either as part of a U.S. joint force or as a member of an alliance/coalition. As an international partner, evaluate your armed forces' concept of employment (or operating doctrine) in light of the current national security concerns and vital interests of your country. What changes would you recommend to address the emerging trends of your region? How would you capitalize on your armed forces' unique advantages? How would you offset your armed forces' shortfalls?

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APPENDIX A

USAWC MISSION

The USAWC educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

USAWC INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING OUTCOMES AY18

Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war. In pursuit of these goals, they study and confer on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

Achieving this objective requires proficiency in four domains of knowledge:

- Theory of war and peace
- U.S. national security policy, processes, and management
- Military strategy and unified theater operations
- Command and leadership

And the ability and commitment to:

- Think critically, creatively, and strategically.
- Frame national security challenges in their historical, social, political, and economic contexts.
- Promote a military culture that reflects the values and ethic of the Profession of Arms.
- Listen, read, speak, and write effectively.
- Advance the intellectual, moral, and physical development of oneself and one's subordinates.

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APPENDIX B

PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (PLOs)

The School of Strategic Landpower (SSL) establishes Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) that relate to critical fields of knowledge and appropriate jurisdictions of practice for our students to master. The core competence of our graduates is leadership in the global application of strategic landpower. The curriculum addresses the “great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.”

To accomplish its mission, SSL presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who are able to:

PLO 1. Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decisionmaking.

PLO 2. Analyze, adapt and develop military processes, organizations, and capabilities to achieve national defense objectives.

PLO 3. Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national policy aims.

PLO 4. Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.

PLO 5. Think critically and creatively in addressing national security issues at the strategic level.

PLO 6. Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

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APPENDIX C

SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME Phase II)

SOURCE: The REP and DEP curricula address requirements for JLAs and JLOs derived from CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, May 29, 2015, Enclosure E-E-1.

1. Learning Area 1 - National Security Strategy.

- a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.
- b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.
- c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.
- d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.
- e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

2. Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment.

- a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.
- b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.
- c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/ irregular approaches to war.

3. Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

4. Learning Area 4 - Command, Control and Coordination.

a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

5. Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders.

c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

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APPENDIX D

AY18 ENDURING THEMES

Elihu Root's challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

- Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment
 - Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)
 - Understand the profession's national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice
 - Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations
 - Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (second- and third-order effects)
 - Analyze the framework for leadings and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change.

- Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means)
 - Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars
 - Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims
 - Analyze how to resource national security
 - Evaluate international relations as the context for national security

- Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security
 - Comprehend Diplomatic Power
 - Comprehend Informational power
 - Evaluate Military Power
 - Comprehend economic power

- Professional ethics
 - Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include jus in bello and post bello)
 - Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include jus ad bello)
 - Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

- Civil-Military Relations
 - Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership
 - Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society
 - Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

- Instruments of war and national security
 - Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)
 - Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments
 - Intergovernmental: Understand potential relationships with other national governments
 - Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

- History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices
 - Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)
 - Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

Course Learning Outcomes/Joint Learning Areas Crosswalk

Joint Learning Area (JLA)		1					2					3					4				5								
TSC Course Learning Outcome		AV18 THEATER STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGNING (TSC) COURSE																											
Joint Learning Objectives (JLO)	Joint Learning Objectives (JLO)	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	d	e	f	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	a	b	c	d	e	f	g		
CLO a	Translate national strategic goals into military objectives and provide military advice to civilian leaders in the development of policy and strategy affecting national security.	C			A							C								C				C	C		C		
CLO b	Develop military options and operational approaches and evaluate campaign plans to achieve military objectives, in concert with other instruments of national power, which realize national strategic goals.		C		C			A	C		A		C				A				C						C		
CLO c	Integrate individual service capabilities, framed through the joint functions across multiple domains, into a Joint Force that accomplishes military objectives across the range of military operations.				C	C	A			A		A				A	A			A	A							C	
CLO d	Evaluate landpower as part of the Joint Force to implement theater strategies and execute campaigns in a theater of operations.				C		C			C											C	C							

A = Achieves the learning objective
C = Contributes to achieving the learning objective

Learning Area 1 - National Security Strategy. [DNSS Lead]	c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives. [DMSPO—TSC]
a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy. [DNSS—NSPS]	d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts. [DMSPO—TSC]
b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels. [DNSS—NSPS]	e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations. [DCLM—DM]
c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations. [DNSS—NSPS]	Learning Area 4 - Command, Control and Coordination. [DMSPO—Lead]
d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives. [DMSPO—TSC]	a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. [DMSPO—TSC]
e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies. [DCLM—DM]	b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option. [DMSPO—TSC]
Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment. [DMSPO—Lead]	c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.
a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations; joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations. [DMSPO—TSC]	Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms. [DCLM—Lead]
b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations. [DMSPO—TSC]	a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment. [DCLM—SL]
c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns. [DNSS—TWS]	b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders. [DCLM—SL]
d. Analyze the role of OCS [Operational Contracting Support] in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment. [DMSPO—TSC]	c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty. [DCLM—SL]
e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions. [DMSPO—TSC]	d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations. [DCLM—SL]
f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war. [DMSPO—TSC]	e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives. [DCLM—SL]
Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIM Capabilities. [National—DCLM Lead; Joint—DMSPO Lead]	f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations. [DCLM—SL]
a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means. [DNSS—NSPS]	g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry. [DCLM—SL]
b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes. [DCLM—DM]	

APPENDIX F

SHORT PAPER RUBRIC

	Criteria	Outstanding	Exceeds Standards	Meets Standards	Needs Improvement	Fails to Meet Standards
Content 50%	<p>Content</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Answers the question, with a focus on key issues. + Demonstrates comprehension of course concepts + Appropriate for audience. + Confirms facts. + Identifies and challenges assumptions and defends positions. + Identifies most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue. + Identifies risk of both action and inaction. + Anticipates and acknowledges other viewpoints and counter-arguments. + Makes feasible, acceptable, suitable recommendations to mitigate risk. 	<p>Point value: 45.1-50</p> <p>Ready for reading by a senior leader with no changes to content.</p>	<p>Point value: 40.1-45</p> <p>Ready for reading by a senior leader with only minor refinement.</p>	<p>Point value: 35.1-40</p> <p>Persuasive. Does not waste reader's time. Perhaps a few unanswered questions. Most facts and assumptions are essential.</p>	<p>Point value: 30.1-35</p> <p>Somewhat persuasive. Many unanswered questions and facts and assumptions that do not clarify the topic.</p>	<p>Point value: 0-30</p> <p>Reader is confused about paper's intent. Riddled with inappropriate or inaccurate facts and assumptions.</p>
Style 25%	<p>Formatting, Grammar, Syntax and Spelling</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Arial, 12-point. + Single space within a paragraph. + Grammar, syntax, spelling comply with USAWC <i>Communicative Arts Directive</i>. 	<p>Point value: 9.1-10</p> <p>No discernible errors.</p>	<p>Point value: 8.1-9</p> <p>Very few discrepancies exist with no consistent patterns.</p>	<p>Point value: 7.1-8</p> <p>Some noticeable discrepancies, but not enough to distract the reader.</p>	<p>Point value: 6.1-7</p> <p>Multiple errors with noticeable patterns but still understandable.</p>	<p>Point value: 0-6</p> <p>Distracting errors that preclude reader from understanding the paper.</p>
	<p>Readability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Uses simple words with one thought per sentence. + Has no excessive words that do not communicate new information to the reader. + Writes in active versus passive voice. + Writes in 3rd person and without contractions. + Military terminology, acronyms, abbreviations are consistent with <i>DOD Dictionary</i>. 	<p>Point value: 13.6-15</p> <p>Exceptionally tightly written. Language use is crystal clear, nuanced, and economical.</p>	<p>Point value: 12.1-13.5</p> <p>Ready for reading by a senior leader with only minor refinement.</p>	<p>Point value: 10.6-12</p> <p>Writing is clear and understandable in a single reading. Conforms to DoD style in references (a) and (b).</p>	<p>Point value: 9.1-10.5</p> <p>Language is minimally understandable and meaning is sometimes fuzzy. Sometimes uses contractions, slang, unexplained acronyms or jargon.</p>	<p>Point value: 0-9</p> <p>Writing is choppy, awkward, and riddled with casual, unprofessional language. The reader is left puzzled about the meaning of the paper.</p>

	Criteria	Outstanding	Exceeds Standards	Meets Standards	Needs Improvement	Fails to Meet Standards
	+ Does not use an acronym unless term occurs more than once in the text and spells it out on first use.					
Organization 25%	<p>Subject or Title</p> <p>+ Clearly communicates in 1 or 2 lines a specific description of memo's content.</p> <p>Summary</p> <p>+ Includes desired outcomes and some supporting key points.</p> <p>Significant Issues</p> <p>+ Only those pertinent to reader's comprehension.</p> <p>Discussion & Background</p> <p>+ What has happened? + What is happening now? + Risk identification.</p> <p>Way Ahead</p> <p>+ Risk mitigation.</p>	<p>Point value: 22.6-25</p> <p>Work is exceptionally organized, with a logical, compelling flow of ideas; nothing superfluous.</p>	<p>Point value: 20.1-22.5</p> <p>Work is efficiently organized, with a logic flow that clearly conveys meaning.</p>	<p>Point value: 17.6-20</p> <p>Work is generally well organized, with a logic flow that adequately conveys meaning.</p>	<p>Point value: 15.1-17.5</p> <p>Work is weakly organized, with a logic flow that is sometimes confusing.</p>	<p>Point value: 0-15</p> <p>Work is disorganized; logic flow is indiscernible.</p>
Add Up Total Points:						

References: (a) "Writing Style Guide and Preferred Usage for DoD Issuances," April 14, 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/writing/Writing_Style_Guide.pdf; (b) DODM 5110.04-M-V1 "DoD Manual for Written Material: Correspondence Management," October 26, 2010; (c) USAWC *Communicative Arts Directive*.

Assessment Guidance. USAWC Memorandum 623-1 requires assessment of student written work to be centered on Content, Organization, and Style, with Content being paramount. A written assignment that receives a Content assessment of Needs Improvement or Fails to Meet Standards cannot receive an overall assessment of Meets Standards—even if both Organization and Style were Outstanding. The Overall assessment cannot be higher than the Content assessment. Overall assessment equals Content assessment when both Organization and Style are assessed at the minimal level of Needs Improvement.

Number Grade	Points	Grade Point Value
5	95.4-100	5.00
5-	90.6-95.3	4.67-4.99
4+	87.4-90.5	4.33-4.66
4	83.8-87.3	4.00-4.32
4-	80.5-83.7	3.67-3.99
3+	77.3-80.4	3.33-3.66
3	73.8-77.2	3.00-3.32
3-	70.6-73.7	2.67-2.99
2	60.6-70.5	1.67-2.66
1	0-60.5	1.00-1.66

APPENDIX G

LONG PAPER RUBRIC

	Criteria	Outstanding	Exceeds Standards	Meets Standards	Needs Improvement	Fails to Meet Standards
Content 50%	Substantive Content Focus on academic approach and quality of research.	Point value: 22.6-25 Reflects both depth and balance of research. Demonstrates an exceptional grasp of doctrinal concepts, using joint and Service publications and/or other reputable literature to support discussions.	Point value: 20.1-22.5 Demonstrates an above average grasp of doctrinal concepts, using joint and Service publications and/or other reputable literature to support discussions.	Point value: 17.6-20 Demonstrates a good grasp of doctrinal concepts. Well supported, often with reputable sources. Minimal use of personal opinion, and sources are well documented.	Point value: 15.1-17.5 Demonstrates fair grasp of doctrinal concepts. Marginally supported, using some joint and Service publications. Excessive reliance on quotations and Internet sources. Weak source documentation.	Point value: 0-15 Demonstrates poor grasp of doctrinal concepts. Weakly supported, using personal opinion. Excessive reliance on quotations and Internet sources. Does not use or cite reputable sources.
	Strategic Thinking Evidence of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.	Point value: 22.6-25 Advances a thoughtful explication of the issue. Routinely synthesizes information into an innovative solution. Challenges assumptions and creatively defends positions.	Point value: 20.1-22.5 Goes beyond mere grasp of essentials to incorporate evaluation – and sometimes synthesis – in using sources and concepts to craft solutions. Challenges assumptions effectively.	Point value: 17.6-20 Ably incorporates analysis – and sometimes evaluation, and synthesis – in using sources and concepts to reach a conclusion. Suggests solutions to problems.	Point value: 15.1-17.5 Compares and contrasts positions, concepts, and data. Strives for analysis; can identify gaps and contradictions. Usually can apply concepts and experiences to solving a problem.	Point value: 0-15 Merely summarizes known information. Rarely displays detailed analysis or creative approaches to problem solving. Fails to apply concepts and experiences to practical uses.
Style 25%	Formatting Following USAWC guidelines for body, citations, and references.	Point value: 4.6-5 All writing format, mechanics, in-text crediting, and foot- or endnote entries follow the AY18 CAD with no errors.	Point value: 4.1-4.5 Almost all writing format, mechanics, in-text crediting, and foot- or endnote entries follow the AY18 CAD. A few errors may exist.	Point value: 3.6-4 Most writing, in-text crediting, and reference page entries follow the AY18 CAD, but some minor format errors exist.	Point value: 3.1-3.5 Writing and in-text crediting is generally sound; however, the paper does not adequately follow AY18 CAD. Multiple errors exist.	Point value: 0-3 Not evident that the provisions of the AY18 CAD are understood or followed.
	Grammar and Spelling	Point value: 4.6-5 No errors, to speak of, in grammar and spelling.	Point value: 4.1-4.5 All grammar, syntax, spelling, and punctuation conform to the AY18 CAD. Some discrepancies exist, but not consistent patterns.	Point value: 3.6-4 Most grammar, syntax, spelling, and punctuation conform to the AY18 CAD. Some noticeable discrepancies and pattern errors exist.	Point value: 3.1-3.5 Grammar, syntax, spelling, and punctuation somewhat conform to the AY18 CAD, but major noticeable discrepancies exist, including pattern errors.	Point value: 0-3 Noticeable and distracting errors in grammar, syntax, spelling, and punctuation. Inattention to details and patterns of consistent errors are excessive.
	Readability Writing flows naturally and is readable,	Point value: 13.6-15 Resonates in smooth expository prose, using	Point value: 12.1-13.5 Resonates in smooth expository prose. Language is	Point value: 10.6-12 Communicates in straightforward manner and academic voice.	Point value: 9.1-10.5 Writes somewhat clearly, but without flair. Language is	Point value: 0-9 Writing is choppy, forced, or exaggerated. Examples and

	reflecting an academic tone of voice.	concrete imagery and pertinent examples. Language is erudite and direct without ostentation. Incorporates examples and sources with the context effortlessly.	direct and exhibits a graceful command of style. Incorporates examples and sources with the context with minimum effort.	Language is understandable and includes examples and sources efficiently.	usually understandable and includes examples and sources that usually fit the context. Sometimes uses contractions, slang, or jargon.	illustrations do not fit the context. Uses contractions, slang, or jargon, and reverts to statements of opinion and authorial intrusion.
Organization 25%	Organization Structure of the work clearly identifies its components and causes the argument to logically flow to the conclusion. Makes coherent sense.	Point value: 22.6-25 Work is superbly organized, with coherent, unified paragraphs and seamless transitions. Crisp thesis statement is supported with compelling rhetorical argument backed by high-quality sources. The work reaches an elegant conclusion followed by creative recommendations	Point value: 20.1-22.5 Work is effectively organized, with coherent paragraphs that are obviously and logically linked in an order that supports the argument. A clear thesis statement is well-supported by robust doctrine, theory, and research, and concludes with cogent recommendations.	Point value: 17.6-20 Work is generally well organized, in clear expository prose. There is a discernible introduction, thesis statement, main body, and conclusion. Transitions are generally effective in maintaining a logical flow of ideas.	Point value: 15.1-17.5 Work is weakly organized, with no clear thesis statement and weak theory and argument. Conclusions are a mere summary of previous points. Transitions are somewhat weak or ineffective.	Point value: 0-15 Work is disorganized and makes an argument that is inconclusive and hard to follow. Prose is rambling, and the rhetoric is unfocused. Conclusions are nonexistent or weak, merely repeating previous statements. Transitions are awkward or entirely absent.
	Total Points:					

Assessment Guidance. USAWC Memorandum 623-1 requires assessment of student written work to be centered on Content, Organization, and Style, with Content being paramount. Work that receives a Content assessment of Needs Improvement or Fails to Meet Standards cannot receive an overall assessment of Meets Standards—even if both Organization and Style were Outstanding. The Overall assessment cannot be higher than the Content assessment. Overall assessment equals Content assessment when both Organization and Style are assessed at the minimal level of Needs Improvement

Number Grade	Points	Grade Point Value
5	95.4-100	5.00
5-	90.6-95.3	4.67-4.99
4+	87.4-90.5	4.33-4.66
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3+	77.3-80.4	3.33-3.66
3	73.8-77.2	3.00-3.32
3-	70.6-73.7	2.67-2.99
2	60.6-70.5	1.67-2.66
1	0-60.5	1.00-1.66

APPENDIX H

ORAL PRESENTATION STANDARDS RUBRIC AND FEEDBACK (CONDENSED)

Oral Presentation Standards	
5 - Outstanding (Expert) (-)	<p><u>Content/Organization/Delivery</u>: Exceeds standards in every salient respect, standing as an exemplar of human excellence in oral communication. Presentation reflects an expert level of in-depth analysis, research, and thought; is effectively tailored to the intended audience; and achieves maximum impact through clear organization and impeccable delivery. There is a remarkable quality and clarity of ideas, analysis, and arguments. The student displays extraordinary oral delivery techniques that delineate the central message. Communications portray confidence derived from grounded knowledge and experience, on the one hand, and openness to the possibility of change on the other. <u>Strategic Thinking</u>: Expert comprehension of the concepts within the course. Able to deftly process information to create new and alternative explanations of theories and concepts. Reflexively challenges assumptions and creatively defends positions, demonstrating exceptional critical and creative thinking skills. Skillfully anticipates and acknowledges other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.</p>
4 - Exceeds Standards (Advanced) (+/-)	<p><u>Content/Organization/Delivery</u>: Speaking skills are impressive and clearly above the norm. Presentation is thoughtfully organized, germane to the audience/situation, and alive with well-constructed arguments that are ably-supported with relevant evidence and solid reasoning. The presentational delivery is clear, crisp, reasonably persuasive, and consistently articulate; the central message is easily understood. The student has a strong facility with analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material. <u>Strategic Thinking</u>: Exceptional comprehension of course concepts. Notable abilities for accurately processing information to create new and innovative explanations of theories. Skilled at challenging assumptions and creatively defending positions, demonstrating outstanding critical thinking skills. Consistently identifies the most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue. Can apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue, and is able to consider ethical implications of a potential approach. Demonstrates skill at applying historical insights to any given situation. Consistently anticipates and acknowledges other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.</p>
3 - Meets Standards (Proficient) (+/-)	<p><u>Content/Organization/Delivery</u>: Presentation reflects in-depth analysis, research, and thought; is tailored to the intended audience; and achieves desired effects through clear organization and delivery. There is a quality and clarity of ideas, analysis and arguments. The student addresses clearly identified major points, often with support from credible and acknowledged sources. Oral delivery techniques (posture, gestures, eye contact, etc.) enable clear conveyance and understanding of the speaker's message. The student demonstrates analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material. <u>Strategic Thinking</u>: Solid comprehension of the concepts within the course. Skilled at processing information to create new explanations of course concepts and theories. Challenges assumptions and creatively defends positions, demonstrating notable critical thinking skills. Proven ability to identify the most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue. Demonstrated ability to apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue. Applies historical insights to any given situation. Proven ability to anticipate and acknowledge other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.</p>
2 - Needs Improvement	<p><u>Content/Organization/Delivery</u>: Communications skills are weak and deficient in one or more salient respects. Content is generally weak, organization unclear, and/or the delivery uninspired. Presentation is characterized by minimal analysis, deficient insight, lack of evidence, inadequate preparation, poor organization, or a cavalier presentational style which leaves some listeners confused and disoriented. Poor oral delivery techniques (posture, gestures, eye contact, etc.) often distract from the intended message. Central message can be deduced, but is not explicitly stated in the presentation. <u>Strategic Thinking</u>: Student lacks a solid command of the concepts within the course. Occasionally demonstrates difficulty in making connections across concepts. When prompted, student challenges assumptions and defends positions, demonstrating some basic critical thinking skills. Shows some creativity in developing new approaches to issues. With assistance, the student can apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue. Occasionally applies historical insights to a given situation. Sporadically acknowledges other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.</p>
1 - Fails to Meet Standards	<p><u>Content/Organization/Delivery</u>: Communications skills are seriously weak or deficient—usually missing the task. The content or substance of the presentation is unsubstantiated, illogical, or exceedingly shabby; the organizational scheme is unorganized and unfocused; the delivery is uninspired and characterized by inarticulate speaking. There is a general lack of effective oral delivery techniques (posture, gestures, eye contact, etc.). Overall lack of a central message, or incorrect/misleading central message. <u>Strategic Thinking</u>: Student fails to demonstrate any command or comprehension of the concepts within the course. Unable to synthesize course concepts. Student fails to challenge assumptions or defend positions. General lack of critical thinking skills. Overall lack of creative thinking skills. Typically unable to identify the most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue. Often fails to apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue and does not consider ethical implications of a potential approach. Lack of skill at applying historical insights to a given situation. Rarely acknowledges other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.</p>

Assessment Guidance. CBks Memorandum 623-1 details that assessment of oral performance centers on presentational Content, Organization, and Delivery with Content being paramount. A presentation in which Content receives an assessment of Needs Improvement or Fails to Meet Standards cannot receive an overall assessment of Meets Standards—even if both Organization and Delivery were Outstanding. The Overall assessment cannot be higher than the Content assessment. Overall assessment equals Content assessment, so long as both Organization and Delivery are assessed at the minimal level of Needs Improvement.

APPENDIX I

ORAL PRESENTATION CONTENT, ORGANIZATION, DELIVERY RUBRIC AND STRATIGEC THINKING

ORAL PRESENTATION (Content)	
5 - Outstanding (Expert) (-)	Exceeds standards in every salient respect, standing as an exemplar of human excellence in oral communication. Presentation reflects an expert level of in-depth analysis, research, and thought and is effectively tailored to the intended audience. There is a remarkable quality and clarity of ideas, analysis and arguments. Presentation is extremely informative and persuasive. The student expertly makes convincing arguments, while also considering all other perspectives, even those that are not obvious. Communications always achieve the stated purpose while favorably accommodating the intended audience. Communications portray confidence derived from grounded knowledge and experience, on the one hand, and openness to the possibility of change on the other.
4 - Exceeds Standards (Advanced) (+/-)	Speaking skills are impressive and clearly above the norm. Presentation germane to the audience/situation and alive with well-constructed arguments that are ably-supported with relevant evidence and solid reasoning. The speaker's facility with analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material is strong. The student makes powerful and convincing arguments, consistently considering all other perspectives. The student has a strong facility with analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material.
3 - Meets Standards (Proficient) (+/-)	Presentation reflects in-depth analysis, research, and thought and is tailored to the intended audience. There is a quality and clarity of ideas, analysis and arguments. Presentation is informative and persuasive. The student is able to make convincing arguments, while also considering other perspectives. The student addresses clearly identified major points, often with support from credible and acknowledged sources. The student demonstrates analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material.
2 - Needs Improvement	Communications skills are weak and deficient in one or more salient respects. Content is generally weak. Presentation is characterized by minimal analysis, deficient insight, lack of evidence, or inadequate preparation. The student has notable difficulties making convincing arguments, and occasionally fails to consider other perspectives.
1 - Fails to Meet Standards	Communications skills are seriously weak or deficient—usually missing the task. The content or substance of the presentation is unsubstantiated, illogical, or exceedingly shabby. The student has serious problems making convincing arguments, and typically fails to consider other perspectives.
ORAL PRESENTATION (Organization)	
5 Outstanding (Expert) (-)	Presentation reflects an expert level of in-depth analysis, research, and thought; is effectively tailored to the intended audience; and achieves maximum impact through clear organization. The central message is superbly delineated.
4 - Exceeds Standards (Advanced) (+/-)	The presentation is thoughtfully organized and germane to the audience/situation. The central message is easily understood.
3 - Meets Standards (Proficient) (+/-)	Presentation is tailored to the intended audience and achieves desired effects through clear organization and conveys a reasonably clear central message.
2 - Needs Improvement	Organization is unclear and poor. Central message can be deduced, but is not explicitly stated in the presentation.

1- Fails to Meet Standards	The organizational scheme is unorganized and unfocused. The presentation lacks a central message or the audience perceives an incorrect or misleading one.
ORAL PRESENTATION (Delivery)	
5 Outstanding (Expert) (-)	Presentation reflects an expert level of in-depth analysis, research, and thought; is laser-focused on the intended audience; and achieves maximum impact through impeccable delivery. The student displays extraordinary oral delivery techniques.
4 - Exceeds Standards (Advanced) (+/-)	The presentational delivery is clear, crisp, reasonably persuasive, and consistently articulate. Skillfully targets the intended audience.
3 - Meets Standards (Proficient) (+/-)	Presentation is tailored to the intended audience and achieves desired effects through effective use of oral delivery techniques (posture, gestures, eye contact, etc.).
2 - Needs Improvement	Delivery is uninspired. Poor oral delivery techniques (posture, gestures, eye contact, etc.) often distract from the intended message. Presentation may be characterized by a cavalier presentational style which leaves some listeners confused and disoriented.
1- Fails to Meet Standards	The delivery is uninspired and characterized by inarticulate speaking. There is a general lack of effective oral delivery techniques (posture, gestures, eye contact, etc.).
ORAL PRESENTATION (Strategic Thinking)	
5 Outstanding (Expert) (-)	The student demonstrates expert comprehension of the concepts within the course. Able to deftly process information to create new and alternative explanations of theories and concepts. Reflexively challenges assumptions and creatively defends positions, demonstrating exceptional critical and creative thinking skills. Always identifies the most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue. Can independently apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue, and is able to consider all implications of a potential approach. Demonstrates an expert level of applying historical insights to any given situation. Skillfully anticipates and acknowledges other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.
4 - Exceeds Standards (Advanced) (+/-)	The student demonstrates exceptional comprehension of course concepts. Notable abilities for accurately processing information to create new and innovative explanations of theories. Skilled at challenging assumptions and creatively defending positions, demonstrating outstanding critical thinking skills. Consistently identifies the most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue. Can apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue, and is able to consider ethical implications of a potential approach. Demonstrates skill at applying historical insights to any given situation. Consistently anticipates and acknowledges other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.
3 - Meets Standards (Proficient) (+/-)	The student demonstrates solid comprehension of the concepts within the course. Skilled at processing information to create new explanations of course concepts and theories. Challenges assumptions and creatively defends positions, demonstrating notable critical thinking skills. Proven ability to identify the most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue. Demonstrated ability to apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue. Applies historical insights to any given situation. Proven ability to anticipate and acknowledge other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.
2- Needs Improvement	Student lacks a solid command of the concepts within the course. Occasionally demonstrates difficulty in making connections across concepts. When prompted,

	<p>student challenges assumptions and defends positions, demonstrating some basic critical thinking skills. Shows some creativity in developing new approaches to issues. Identifies the most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue when prompted. With assistance, the student can apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue. Occasionally applies historical insights to a given situation. Sporadically acknowledges other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.</p>
<p>1- Fails to Meet Standards</p>	<p>Student fails to demonstrate any command or comprehension of the concepts within the course. Unable to synthesize course concepts. Student failed to challenge assumptions or defend positions. General lack of critical thinking skills. Overall lack of creative thinking skills. Typically unable to identify the most significant implications and consequences of potential approaches to an issue. Often fails to apply ethical perspectives and concepts to a complex issue and does not consider ethical implications of a potential approach. Lack of skill at applying historical insights to a given situation. Rarely acknowledges other viewpoints and potential counter-arguments.</p>

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APPENDIX J

SEMINAR CONTRIBUTION RUBRIC

Seminar Contribution Standards	
5 - Outstanding (Expert) (-)	Seminar contribution reflects an expert level of in-depth analysis, research, and thought, and is effectively tailored to the intended audience. There is a remarkable quality and clarity of ideas, analysis, and arguments. Contribution is extremely informative and persuasive. The student expertly makes convincing arguments, while also considering all other perspectives, even those that are not obvious. Contribution portrays confidence derived from grounded knowledge and experience, on the one hand, and openness to the possibility of change on the other. <u>Strategic Thinking</u> : Able to deftly process information to create new and alternative explanations of theories and concepts. Reflexively challenges assumptions and creatively defends positions, demonstrating exceptional critical and creative thinking skills.
4 - Exceeds Standards (Advanced) (+/-)	Seminar contribution is thoughtfully organized, germane to the audience/situation, and alive with well-constructed arguments that are ably supported with relevant evidence and solid reasoning. The student's facility with analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material is strong. The student makes powerful and convincing arguments, consistently considering all other perspectives. <u>Strategic Thinking</u> : Notable abilities for accurately processing information to create new and innovative explanations of theories. Skilled at challenging assumptions and creatively defending positions, demonstrating outstanding critical thinking skills.
3 - Meets Standards (Proficient) (+/-)	Seminar contribution reflects in-depth analysis, research, and thought and is tailored to the intended audience. There is a quality and clarity of ideas, analysis, and arguments. Contribution is informative and persuasive. The student is able to make convincing arguments, while also considering other perspectives. The student addresses clearly identified major points, often with support from credible and acknowledged sources. The student demonstrates analytical reasoning and the ability to synthesize and integrate material. <u>Strategic Thinking</u> : Skilled at processing information to create new explanations of course concepts and theories. Challenges assumptions and creatively defends positions, demonstrating notable critical thinking skills.
Needs Improvement (2)	Seminar contribution is characterized by minimal analysis, deficient insight, lack of evidence, or inadequate preparation. The student has notable difficulties making convincing arguments, and occasionally fails to consider other perspectives. Central message can be deduced but is not explicitly stated. <u>Strategic Thinking</u> : Occasionally demonstrates difficulty in making connections across concepts. When prompted, student challenges assumptions and defends positions, demonstrating some basic critical thinking skills.

Student Self Evaluation for lessons TSC-___ to TSC-___
 (Using the rubric above, evaluate your contributions to seminar learning).

<i>Student Evaluation</i>	<i>FI Evaluation</i>

Provide a few thoughts on what efforts you would sustain:

Provide a few thoughts on how you might improve your contribution:

Faculty Instructor Comments:

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APPENDIX K
OFFSITE ACCESS
TO COURSE READINGS AND LIBRARY DATABASES

Blackboard

Blackboard is a Web-based learning management system (LMS) designed to support fully online courses or provide a space for face-to-face course supplementation. The USAWC uses Blackboard as a means to deliver USAWC curriculum content to mobile devices. Communication and collaboration opportunities are accessible with a wide variety of personal computing devices such as desktops, laptops, tablets, netbooks, e-readers, media players, smart phones, and others. All syllabus and digitally available media will be made available at Blackboard.com at <https://armywarcollege.blackboard.com/>, please contact Mr. Christopher Smart at Christopher.a.smart.civ@mail.mil, or 245-4874.

EZproxy

EZproxy enables access to licensed database content when you are not on Carlisle Barracks. It operates as an intermediary server between your computer and the Library's subscription databases.

Links

You will find EZproxy links to full text readings in online syllabi, directives, bibliographies, reading lists, and emails. Usually, instructors and librarians provide these links so that you can easily access course materials anytime, anywhere. It also helps us comply with copyright law and saves money on the purchase of copyright permissions.

Library Databases - You can use EZproxy to access Library databases when you are away from Root Hall. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on any database in the Library Databases column, such as ProQuest, EBSCO OmniFile, or FirstSearch, and then use your EZproxy username and password to login.

Username and Password - From home, when you click on a link that was built using EZproxy, or you are accessing a particular database, you will be prompted to provide a username and password. You only need to do this once per session. You will find EZproxy login information on the wallet-size card you were given by the Library. If you have misplaced yours, just ask at the Access Services Desk for another card, contact us by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil <usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil>. You can also access the library portal from the ArmyWar College homepage at: <https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/Pages/default.aspx>. Please do not share EZproxy login information with others.

Impact of Firewalls

Most Internet service providers (ISPs) do not limit the areas you can access on the Internet, so home users should not encounter problems with firewalls. However, corporate sites often do employ firewalls and may be highly restrictive in what their employees can access, which can impede EZproxy.

ACCESS SOLUTIONS

Try Again!

Many problems with EZproxy are caused simply by login errors. If your first login attempt fails, try again. Check to make sure the Caps Lock is not on. Or, if you see a Page Not Found message after you do login, use the Back button and click on the link again. It may work the second time.

Broken Link - If a link appears to be broken, you can find the article by using the appropriate database instead. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on the database name, type in your EZproxy username and password to login, and then search for the specific article.

Browsers

EZproxy works independently from operating systems and browsers, but problems may be caused by your browser if you have not downloaded and installed the newest version. Also, it is a good idea to check to make sure that the security settings on your browser are not too restrictive and that it will accept cookies and allow pop ups. Be aware ISPs that use proprietary versions of browsers, such as AOL, can interfere with EZproxy. A simple workaround is to connect to your provider, minimize the window, and then open a browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

Databases

Not all remote access problems are caused by EZproxy. Occasionally databases will have technical problems. Deleting cookies might help. You may successfully pass through EZproxy only to find an error caused by the database. If this happens, back out of the database and try using another one. It is unlikely that both providers would be having technical problems at the same time. Generally, database problems are resolved quickly.

Help and Tips - For assistance, please contact the USAWC Research Librarians by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.library@mail.mil. Or Root Hall, **ACCESS SERVICES, INTERLIBRARY LOAN, and COURSE RESERVES**, (717) 245-4288; (717) 245-4298; (717) 245-4610. Email: usawc.library@us.army.mil.

APPENDIX L

DMSPO STUDENT CRITIQUE

1. Analyses of student views of the USAWC courses are an extremely important input to the curriculum planning process. The course evaluation consists of a computer-assisted questionnaire. You can access the computerized survey system through any of the computers in the Executive Skills Center or your seminar room in Root Hall. Directions on how to use the computer survey system are in your *Automation Handbook*.

2. You will be contacted via email once the computer survey is available, and you will be notified of the desired completion date at that time. Questions on the survey should be directed to the Director of Institutional Assessment, 245-3365.

3. The stated outcomes of "Theater Strategy and Campaigning" are on page 3 of the Course Directive. For your convenience, they are listed below. Please review them prior to completing the course evaluation survey.

a. **Translate** national strategic goals into military objectives and provide military advice to civilian leaders in the development of policy and strategy affecting national security. (PLOs 3, 5)

b. **Develop** military options and operational approaches and evaluate campaign plans to achieve military objectives, in concert with other instruments of national power, which realize national strategic goals. (PLOs 3, 5)

c. **Integrate** individual service capabilities, framed through the joint functions across multiple domains, into a Joint Force that accomplishes military objectives across the range of military operations. (PLOs 2, 3)

d. **Evaluate** landpower as part of the Joint Force to implement theater strategies and execute campaigns in a theater of operations. (PLO 3)

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APPENDIX M

BLOOM'S TAXONOMY *

BLOOM'S TAXONOMY OF CATEGORIES IN THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN*
 From OPMEP, CJCSI 1800.01E, 29 May 2015. Appendix A to Enclosure E. "Levels of Learning Achievement. Below is a list of descriptive verbs representative of "Bloom's taxonomy," which constitutes a useful hierarchy of possible levels of learning. The verbs are used to define the JPME objectives..."

Level	Illustrative Level	Definitions
Knowledge	arrange, define, describe, identify, know, label, list, match, memorize, name, order, outline, recognize, relate, recall, repeat, reproduce, select, state	Remembering previously learned information.
Comprehension	classify, comprehend, convert, define, discuss, distinguish, estimate, explain, express, extend, generalize, give example(s), identify, indicate, infer, locate, paraphrase, predict, recognize, rewrite, report, restate, review, select, summarize, translate	Grasping the meaning of information.
Application	apply, change, choose, compute, demonstrate, discover, dramatize, employ, illustrate, interpret, manipulate, modify, operate, practice, predict, prepare, produce, relate, schedule, show, sketch, solve, use, write	Applying knowledge to actual situations.

Analysis	analyze, appraise, breakdown, calculate, categorize, classify, compare, contrast, criticize, derive, diagram, differentiate, discriminate, distinguish, examine, experiment, identify, illustrate, infer, interpret, model, outline, point out, question, related, select, separate, subdivide, test	Breaking down objects or ideas into simpler parts and seeing how the parts relate and are organized.
Synthesis	arrange, assemble, categorize, collect, combine, comply, compose, construct, create, design, develop, devise, explain, formulate, generate, plan, prepare, propose, rearrange, reconstruct, relate, reorganize, revise, rewrite, set up, summarize, synthesize, tell, write	Rearranging component ideas into a new whole.
Evaluating	appraise, argue, assess, attach, choose, compare, conclude, contrast, defend, Evaluating describe, discriminate, estimate, evaluate, explain, judge, justify, interpret, relate, predict, rate, select, summarize, support, value	Making judgments based on internal evidence or external criteria.
Creating	categorize, combine, compile, compose, create, devise, design, explain, generate, modify, organize, plan, rearrange, reconstruct, relate, reorganize, revise, rewrite, summarize	Building a structure or pattern from diverse elements.

* Adapted from: Bloom, B. S., ed. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals. Handbook I, Cognitive Domain. New York: Longmans, Green, 1956.